Beiheft 17

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Historical Consciousness and Political Action

 

Cover image: Untitled, by Ben Noble (3 March 2018).

+ THEODOR SCHIEDER, The Role of Historical Consciousness in Political Action, History and Theory 17 (December 1978), Bei. 17, 1-18.

Historical consciousness refers not only to a knowledge of the past but implies the use of that knowledge to understand the future. Many elements blur our perception of history as it regards current political action. It may cripple us with the realization of the relative inability of individuals to effect change. In addition, our memories of the past tend to be selective and short. We may remember falsity rather than truth. History, itself, may be used as evidence in the support of particular political positions merely for the benefit of a single group. Nonetheless, all of us are affected to some extent by the understanding of our historical traditions and in its best form this knowledge leads us from legend toward truth. The current trend to ignore historical education could prevent us from learning that the truth of the past forms the core of our knowledge of the future.

+ WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN, Social Conditioning and Social Relevance of Historical Judgments, History and Theory 17 (December 1978), Bei. 17, 19-35.

The contribution of historical judgment to a rational world view can be understood only if it is assumed that the conceptual tools of an historian are, at least in part, culturally determined. The historian's cultural tools include his social self-image, and notions of past change and future development. Both the typological and the narrative forms of historical explanation are, in Hempel's terms, partial explanations which emphasize only selected causal relationships. Though these explanations do not meet Popper's and Nagel's standards of verification because they cannot be proven false, they can be verified intersubjectively. The extent and the integration of source material as well as the logical consistency of an explanation can be tested. Through a rational criticism of the assumptions underlying historical explanation, a society can also critically examine its assumptions about the present.

+ KARL-GEORG FABER, The Use of History in Political Debate, History and Theory 17 (December 1978), Bei. 17, 36-67.

During the nineteenth century, writers of the historicist school argued that though knowledge of the past cannot be directly applied to daily problems, it is nevertheless indispensable for a true understanding of the present. In practice, however, both politicians and historians used historical arguments to support political positions. This is illustrated by a study of the use of history in the political debates over the Polish question (1848), the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), and the Ostverträge (1972). These debates illustrate three uses of historical evidence in policy arguments. The forms include the projected success or failure of a particular decision, the moral and legal implications of that decision, and the symbolic values which the decision reflected. There is, however, a fundamental contradiction between history and politics. While history must methodologically suspend normative premises, political decisions are founded upon the notion of a right distribution of power.

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