Beiheft 5
+ JOHN PASSMORE, The Idea of a History of Philosophy, History and Theory 4 (1964-1965), Bei. 5, 1-32.
Polemical writings about philosophers, of little use if directed against straw men as is likely if not based on historical understanding, must incorporate cultural history, which, in focussing on a philosophy's relationship to its age, justifies ignoring historical sequence so long as figures are placed in context. Philosophy does progressively clarify what certain recurrent types of problems involve. The historian-philosopher writing a history of problems must know intimately philosopher and period, and reveal assumptions and aspects of problems hidden to the philosopher himself. Such a history does not merely report philosophy's results but alone elucidates its inner development.
+ MAURICE MANDELBAUM, The History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History of Philosophy, History and Theory 4 (1964-1965), Bei. 5, 33-66.
The history of ideas deals with the elemental unit-ideas which for Lovejoy are components of systems distinguished by their patterns. Special histories explain how a particular form of human history developed. General histories draw on special histories to document or explain social contexts. Since patterns influence philosophers, the history of ideas contributes little to the history of philosophy, a discontinuous strand within a period's continuous intellectual history. By accepting cultural pluralism, denying the monistic position that there always are internal connections among all or some strands of intellectual and cultural history, both continuity and change in philosophy can be best understood.
+ W. H. WALSH, Hegel on the History of Philosophy, History and Theory 4 (1964-1965), Bei. 5, 67-82.
Even though for Hegel the historian rethinks, positions not as past but as necessary stages in his own philosophical development, the history of philosophy remains external to philosophy proper since a genius could work out from the beginning the stages in the Idea's progress. Hegel's critical history allocates space according to philosophical, not historical considerations, saying little about historical contexts. Non-Hegelians also emphasize assessment more than narration, and all historians of the arts and sciences must make judgments of both importance and value. The history of philosophy, however, has become more historical; assessment requires understanding a philosopher's meaning through his historical situation.
+ EUGENE KAMENKA, Marxism and the History of Philosophy, History and Theory 4 (1964-1965), Bei. 5, 83-104.
The materialist interpretation of history dogmatically resolves all histories into one. Marx and Engels themselves thought philosophy progresses toward the ultimate truth of Marxism, and implicitly held all historical positions interesting since their development reveals contradictions generated by inadequacies. Bolshevik Marxism's official ideology does not include philosophy's dissolution. Marxist definitions of philosophy emphasizing correct conclusions neglect distinctively philosophical argument and method. The recent Soviet view of philosophy's history has changed from the history of superstructure to the history of conflicting materialist and idealist theories, thereby conceding the centrality of philosophical ideas rather than trying to reduce them to class or economic interests.