Volume 12
Written By Elizabeth Boyle
ARTICLES
David Goddard, "Max Weber and the Objectivity of Social Science," History and Theory 12, no. 1 (1973), 1-22.
Neither a Weberian methodology of social science, nor the rationale provided by Anglo-American logical positivism, can give an adequate account of the objectivity of the human sciences with the sole exception of history. The Kantian theory of objectivity presupposed by Weber's sociology left it with no object, but rather an indefinite range of phenomena defined from an indefinite number of points of view. Here cultural phenomena can only be perceived under the category of meaning or value which accentuates selected aspects of reality. The root of the dilemma is Weber's conception of the subject matter of the social sciences as a contingent flow of actions and events. Nothing can be objectified from the synthesis of this manifold except limited historical sequences. However, the subject matter of the social sciences presents itself as already synthesized by the activities of conscious social subjects, and this organized reality can be theoretically articulated. Society is not conceivable at all without the idea of a system which lies behind it.
Hayden V. White, "Foucault Decoded: Notes from Underground," History and Theory 12, no. 1 (1973), 23-54.
Michel Foucault's Les Mots et les choses correctly asserts that the attempts of the human sciences of the past five hundred years to represent the world in language have failed because these sciences did not recognize the opacity or thingness of language itself. Foucault pretends to have written a plotless anti-history of the human sciences which stresses the discontinuities that characterize the succession of one "'episteme" by another. In fact, he has explained these vicissitudes by the changes of tropological strategy that underlie epistemic shifts. Although he disavows the movement, Foucault's interest in revealing the poetic basis of all linguistic representations of reality places him in the eschatological wing of the structuralist establishment.
Robert North, "Bibliography of Works in Theology and History," History and Theory 12, no. 1 (1973), 55-140.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Jacques Dupâquier on Population et Histoire by E. A. Wrigley and Christian Plessis, History and Theory 12, no. 1 (1973), 141-146.
Robert D. Schulzinger on Yalta by Diane Shaver Clemens and The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945-1955 by Athan G. Theoharis, History and Theory 12, no. 1 (1973), 146-162.
ARTICLES
Gilbert Shapiro, John Markoff and Sasha R. Weitman, "Quantitative Studies of the French Revolution," History and Theory 12, no. 2 (1973), 163-191.
As a study in social structure and the movement toward revolution, the case of the French Revolution, though unique, offers vast possibilities for the discovery of general principles and uniformities of social organization, change, and development. The methodology involves the interpretation of systematic covariations through a procedure of "Concrete Analytic Coding," i.e., code-aided content analysis. This permits the production of a detailed index available to other researchers with a code that is analytic and mnemonic. The materials for the analysis are the cahiers de doleances, the most complete indicators of public opinion from all of France at the time.
Jerzy Topolski, "Levi-Strauss and Marx on History," History and Theory 12, no. 2 (1973), 192-207.
Lévi-Strauss's proposed link between his theory of history and Marx's is misleading. Believing that social reality and human actions are determined by unconscious and universal structures of the mind, he discounts the historical process as a contributor to man's consciousness. The codes of the unconscious structures are a priori rules for decision making; possible options are determined by chance. History consists of accidental events determined by discontinuous choices. Unlike Lévi-Strauss, Marx based his theories on praxis informed by man's consciousness. Rational decisions are limited solely by our awareness of surrounding, conditions, which we can change. Unlike Lévi -Strauss' models, Marx's are verifiable and his history is continuous.
Myriam Yardeni, "Journalisme et Histoire Contemporaine a L'Epoque de Bayle," History and Theory 12, no. 2 (1973), 208-229.
The efflorescence of journals, gazettes, and "mercures" in France beginning in the seventeenth century not only created a Republic of Letters but transformed the conception and practice of contemporary history and even of history in general. They recorded and documented events to an extent before unimaginable, and specialized journals enlarged the concept of history from politics to culture in all its aspects. Though journalists had the lowest status and reporting was unreliable, such savants as Bayle, Vigneul-Marville, and Camusat saw clearly the importance and potentialities of journalism as a resource for contemporary historiography.
REVIEW ESSAYS
F. W. Walbank on The Development of Greek Biography by Arnaldo Momigliano, History and Theory 12, no. 2 (1973), 230-240.
Maurice Mandelbaum on A Theory of Justice by John Rawls, History and Theory 12, no. 2 (1973), 240-250.
Richard Buel, Jr. on Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History by J. G. A. Pocock, History and Theory 12, no. 2 (1973), 251-264.
Klemens von Klemperer on The German Historians and England. A Study in Nineteenth-Century Views by Charles E. McClelland, History and Theory 12, no. 2 (1973), 265-267.
ARTICLES
Adrian Kuzminski, "The Paradox of Historical Knowledge,'" History and Theory 12, no. 3 (1973), 269-289.
The problem of universals versus particulars is central to the paradox of historical knowledge. History interpreted in terms of a closed set of universals denies qualitative change; history interpreted in terms of unique events allows no support for generalizations. Three approaches to this problem are: rationalist, intuitive, and philosophic history. Rationalist and intuitive history are unsatisfactory. Rationalist history is deterministic, reducing experiences to strictly defined universals. Intuitive history, stressing the particular, is subjective. To overcome this dilemma, philosophic history would have to develop a notion of universals stable enough to sustain order and flexible enough to allow for real change. Such a notion can be found in the manner in which entities are created through metaphoric conflation.
C. Behan McCullagh, "Historical Instrumentalism,'" History and Theory 12, no. 3 (1973), 290-306.
Instrumentalists use history to explain present entities or situations, not to explain an independent past. They incorrectly view historical hypotheses as imaginative reconstructions designed to explain present data. In fact, historical hypotheses do not imply the evidence, the evidence implies the hypotheses. Despite instrumentalist claims, the fact that an historical hypothesis best explains the evidence does not necessarily prove it true. Instrumentalists analogize history to science, but the incompatibility of subject matter and method invalidates the analogy. Scientific hypotheses discuss postulated abstract entities; historical hypotheses discuss common occurrences about which there is much general knowledge. Scientific explanations use laws and theories; historical explanations use events and circumstances.
Charles D. Tarlton, "Historicity, Meaning, and Revisionism in the Study of Political Thought,'" History and Theory 12, no. 3 (1973), 307-328.
J. G. A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and John Dunn try to introduce historicity into the study of political thought. Believing that meaning is relational, they attempt to build cognitive contexts in which to fit events. Yet, their structural focus is often either ill-defined or overly simplified. They claim that if any statement is fixed into its proper context, the context will help to explain it. But the historical context is not always clearly understood itself; this is acting under the "illusion of historical solidity and substance." They see language as the limitation of action, while actually it is a tool for inventiveness of thought.
REVIEW ESSAYS
J. E. Seigel on Alienation. Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society by Bertell Ollman, History and Theory 12, no. 3 (1973), 329-342.
Samuel Kinser on Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient Other Cultures by G. S. Kirk, History and Theory 12, no. 3 (1973), 343-451.
Thomas W. Africa on The Ancient Historians by Michael Grant, History and Theory 12, no. 3 (1973), 351-357.
Walter A. Sedelow, Jr. on Communicational Analysis and Methodology for Historians by Louis George Heller, History and Theory 12, no. 3 (1973), 358-365.
ARTICLES
Philip Pomper, "Problems of a Naturalistic Psychohistory," History and Theory 12, no. 4 (1973), 367-388.
In the absence of a generally accepted biopsychological theory, naturalistically inclined psychohistorians have only been able to establish speculative typologies of historical human behavior. Although the Freudian conflict theory has proven an attractive psychohistorical tool, it is inherently methodologically deficient, and its assimilation to salvationist ideologies has obscured its naturalistic aspects. Epidemiological data on the incidence and distribution of mental distress might prove invaluable in determining criteria for psychological survivability in a given culture, but little useful data of this kind have appeared. In analyzing revolutions, psychohistorians have failed to correlate conclusively such upheavals with specific shifts in the psychological makeup of the society in question.
Linda Gardiner Janik, "Lorenzo Valla: The Primacy of Rhetoric and the De-Moralization of History," History and Theory 12, no. 4 (1973), 389-404.
Lorenzo Valla's historical methodology was linked to his stress on rhetoric; he believed in oratorical persuasion, not logical argument. Refusing to screen historical events according to their moral value, he included accounts of all events. Truth was not for him an external standard, but a standard for judging propositions. Truth lay in the correct usage of words: correct language could create a correct picture of the world. Valla's concept of verisimilitude hinged on historical plausibility, not moral worth. History should be a true account, correctly worded. Because of his talent to persuade the reader, plausible (yet not necessarily true) events illustrating his point were also included.
Jack W. Meiland, "The Historical Relativism of Charles A. Beard," History and Theory 12, no. 4 (1973), 405-413.
Despite seemingly ambiguous writings, Beard is a relativist. Beard states that if historical conceptions are relative, then relativity is relative; this is not a rejection of relativism. As times change, doctrines become outmoded. Beard's times were right for relativism, so he was a relativist, despite his knowledge of its eventual demise. Relativism cannot provide the historian with a frame of reference to interpret the "totality of history." He must choose a comprehensive and informed frame. Beard seems to indicate that historians can forecast the future; yet, this contradicts his rejection of absolute historical truths. He is not discussing forecasting future events, but forecasting future frames of reference.
REVIEW ESSAYS
John Passmore on History, Man, and Reason. A Study in Nineteenth-Century Thought by Maurice Mandelbaum, History and Theory 12, no. 4 (1973), 414-419.
Robert W. Hanning on L'Historien au Moyen Âge by Benoît Lacroix and O. P. Montreal, History and Theory 12, no. 4 (1973), 419-434.
C. Behan McCullagh on History as Applied Science: A Philosophical Study by William Todd, History and Theory 12, no. 4 (1973), 435-452.
Cover image: Underground passage in Munich, by Dominik Martin (9 June 2016)
