Volume 1
Written By Elizabeth Boyle
ARTICLES
Isaiah Berlin, "History and Theory: The Concept of Scientific History," History and Theory 1, no. 1 (1960), 1-31.
History details the differences among events, whereas the sciences focus on similarities. History lacks the sciences' ideal models, whose usefulness varies inversely with the number of characteristics to which they apply. As an external observer the scientist willingly distorts the individual to make it an instance of the general, but the historian, himself an actor, renounces interest in the general in order to understand the past through the projection of his own experience upon it. It is the scientist's business to fit the facts to the theory, the historian's responsibility to place his confidence in facts over theories.
William Dray, "Toynbee's Search for Historical Laws," History and Theory 1, no. 1 (1960), 32-54.
Toynbee was not a faultless practitioner of his empirical methodology, but his concepts of evidence, verification, and law are adequate in principle. Toynbee's affirmation of a tough-minded metaphysical doctrine of free will, however, has the result that all "evidence" for historical laws is only presumptive and that no laws can ever be established. Since the doctrine may be treated as an excresence upon Toynbee's theory of history, the indeterminist and antinomian should ignore or reformulate it in assessing Toynbee's conclusions.
Arthur Lee Burns, "International Theory and Historical Explanation," History and Theory 1, no. 1 (1960), 55-74.
The historian of international affairs deals with sub-system dominant relations where the behavior of a single sub-system (nation) may significantly affect that of the system. For such a system, explanations of unplanned, gross events which utilize alleged theoretical laws are gratuitous; when a detailed reconstruction of the roles played by individual agents is sought, the deductive model of Popper and Hempel itself provides only an "explanation sketch." A general theory of international affairs, dealing exhaustively with every possible type of systematic relationship between sovereign nations, would nevertheless be valuable in establishing the a priori plausibility of certain events.
Gerald J. Gruman, "'Balance' and 'Excess' as Gibbon's Explanation of the Decline and Fall," History and Theory 1, no. 1 (1960), 75-85.
Gibbon's explanation of the decline and fall consists in his applying to political phenomena the concepts of "balance" and "excess" which preoccupied the Whig aristocrat. For example, at its best foreign policy preserves the balance of power among nations. Excessive Roman domination led to cultural uniformity and mediocrity, which invited the barbarians. Scholars minimize the presence of a consistent causal explanation in Gibbon's work largely because of Gibbon's own inconsistencies in dating the beginning of the decline, and because Gibbon's account begins with the later Antonine period, whereas the excesses causing the decline and fall occurred in the late Republic.
REVIEW ESSAYS
E. Harris Harbison on The Meaning and Matter of History: A Christian View by M. C. D'Arcy, History and Theory 1, no. 1 (1960), 86-89.
Hans Meyerhoff on Theories of History by Patrick Gardiner, History and Theory 1, no. 1 (1960), 90-97.
Crane Brinton on The Structure of Nations and Empires: A Study of the Recurring Patterns and Problems of the Political Order in Relation to the Unique Problems of the Nuclear Age by Reinhold Niebuhr, History and Theory 1, no. 1 (1960), 97-102.
ARTICLES
Raymond Aron, "History and Theory: The Concept of Scientific History," History and Theory 1, no. 2 (1961), 103-128.
International problems are not reducible to economic and social conjuncture. Thucydides therefore focuses on events, particular human acts performed freely-chosen, and thus themselves irreducible to junctures of forces. No twentieth-century Thucydides could exist; no intelligible account of the wars of the present century could omit references to actors, but they would not be of central interpretative importance. Modern events are disindividualized, modern collective decisions numerous and complex. Thucydides nevertheless remains significant today to those unwilling to view events divorced from the action of individuals. As an historian Thucydides experienced a feeling of destiny looking back upon free actions, but still held that they alone merit attention.
Ben Halpern, "’Myth’ and ‘Ideology’ in Modern Usage," History and Theory 1, no. 2 (1961), 129-149.
Popular and technical usages yield unequivocal definitions of "myth"' and "ideology," terms which imply distinct meanings of "history" as both accumulated symbolic product and dynamic symbolic production. "Culture," the historical symbolic realm, is analyzable objectively as accumulation in terms of art, law, etc., or subjectively as dynamic process through mythology and ideology-the former dealing with beliefs originating in historical experience, value integration, and establishment of consensus, the latter with beliefs originating in competitive social situations and their communication and segregation. Irrational mythologies spark historical dynamism, rational ideologies extend it. Sorel, Mannheim, and other writers here examined use these distinctions systematically in historical interpretation.
Carey B. Joynt and Nicholas Rescher, "The Problem of Uniqueness in History," History and Theory 1, no. 2 (1961), 150-162.
Every individual event, qua individual, is unique. Thought renders events non-unique through classification and generalization. Historical explanation demands understanding causal connections, in turn requiring the use of generalizations. History is a consumer of established laws which introduce a locus of non-uniqueness into history. Also, history is a producer of limited generalizations, covering temporally confined structural patterns which constitute the locus of uniqueness in history. It is the temporal limitation of these patterns, and not the chronological description of facts, which gives history its character of uniqueness.
Lee Benson and Cushing Strout, "Causation and the American Civil War: Two Appraisals," History and Theory 1, no. 2 (1961), 163-185.
Benson: Certain logical principles govern explanations of human behavior: alleged causes must actually occur before their effects; men must be aware of events that allegedly affect them; explanations must jibe with generalizations about behavior and have intrinsic plausibility. Historians often neglect these principles. The best example is analysis of public opinion. Comparison of Thucydides with the historiography of the American Civil War shows both must assess public feeling on specific issues at a given time and place; but historians lack the tools to do this, and have recourse to dubious assumptions (such as that writers are the best reflection of public opinion). Sometimes even the principle of chronological priority is violated. Consistent application of the four logical principles above would at least narrow the range of potentially verifiable explanations and consequent disagreement.
Strout: Specification of a "fundamental cause" of the Civil War or other events is best construed as a retrospective observation that the cited 16cause" figures centrally in some reconstructed story. Historians explain through stories, narrations, which aim at comprehending the dramatic "logic" of a sequence of events rather than at scientific explanation. At worst general questions of causality are an irrelevant source of interminable disagreement, at best a stimulus to research, potentially resulting in a more coherent story and increased understanding. Causal accounts seem indispensable largely because explanations often involve purposes and reasons in causal disguise.
CLASSICS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
James Fitzjames Stephen, “The Study of History," History and Theory 1, no. 2 (1961), 186-201.
A science of history does not threaten morals. "Laws governing matter," a misleading metaphor deriving from human laws (commands) used in governance, illicitly suggests inanimate objects governed by some necessity. Scientific "laws," better labeled "formulas," are records of facts. Predictions state that we have no doubt some event will occur, not that we are powerless to prevent it. Freedom is compatible with regularity. Men are as free to act regularly as irregularly-indeed, capricious action signals disease, not freedom. The criterion of blameworthy acts is voluntariness, not regularity or predictability. We praise and blame because human nature is so constituted.
REVIEW ESSAYS
R. V. Sampson on The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods by Frank E. Manuel and Historical Pessimism in the French Enlightenment by Henry Vyverberg, History and Theory 1, no. 2 (1961), 202-210.
John Clive on The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay by George Otto Trevelyan, History and Theory 1, no. 2 (1961), 210-215.
John C. Rule on The Pragmatic Revolt in American History: Carl Becker and Charles Beard by Cushing Strout, Carl Becker, and Charles Beard, History and Theory 1, no. 2 (1961), 215-219.
Bruce Mazlish on From History to Sociology: The Transition in German Historical Thought by Carlo Antoni, Benedetto Croce, and Hayden V. White, History and Theory 1, no. 2 (1961), 219-227.
ARTICLES
Maurice Mandelbaum, "Historical Explanation: The Problem of 'Covering Laws,'" History and Theory 1, no. 3 (1961), 229-242.
Laws through which we explain particular events need not be laws which describe uniform sequences of events; they may be laws stating uniform connections between two types of factor contained within a complex event. Hempel's apparent insistence that laws state the conditions invariably accompanying a type of complex event, that the event be an instance of the laws "covering" it, results from the Humean analysis in which causation obtains between types of events and "the cause" means necessary conditions. But historians often depict sufficient conditions. On the other hand, some knowledge of general laws is a presupposition of Dray's "continuous series" model of historical explanation.
Gabriel Kolko, "Max Weber on America: Theory and Evidence," History and Theory 1, no. 3 (1961), 243-260.
Weber's treatment of the Protestant Ethic in American colonial economic history is indefensible in terms of historical evidence; his ideal-typology of the causal importance of Calvinism in the development of Western capitalism generally is at best a useful fiction. Weber neither understood the economic demands of Puritan doctrine nor appreciated the disparity between ideology and economic reality. Weber's prerequisites for rational capitalism were not satisfied in the colonies, and his contrast between economic development in the North and non-Calvinist South is erroneous. Economic success in the colonies was determined far more by political and social connections than by special religious motivations.
Gerhard Ritter, "Scientific History, Contemporary History, and Political Science," History and Theory 1, no. 3 (1961), 261-279.
Weber's treatment of the Protestant Ethic in American colonial economic history is indefensible in terms of historical evidence; his ideal-typology of the causal importance of Calvinism in the development of Western capitalism generally is at best a useful fiction. Weber neither understood the economic demands of Puritan doctrine nor appreciated the disparity between ideology and economic reality. Weber's prerequisites for rational capitalism were not satisfied in the colonies, and his contrast between economic development in the North and non-Calvinist South is erroneous. Economic success in the colonies was determined far more by political and social connections than by special religious motivations.
REVIEW ESSAYS
David S. Berkowitz on Truth and Opinion: Historical Essays by C. V. Wedgwood, History and Theory 1, no. 3 (1961), 280-291.
Donald B. Meyer on Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History by Erik H. Erikson, History and Theory 1, no. 3 (1961), 291-297.
George H. Nadel on Moderne Geschichtsschreibung: Ausblick auf eine Philosophie der Geschichtswissenschaft by Fritz Wagner, History and Theory 1, no. 3 (1961), 297-305.
Ben Halpern on Between Past and Present by Nathan Rotenstreich, History and Theory 1, no. 3 (1961), 305-309.
Bibliography of Works in the Philosophy of History, 1945-1957
J. C. R., Introductory Note, History and Theory, Beiheft 1(1961), v-vii.
"Chronological List," History and Theory, Beiheft 1(1961), 1-74.
"Index of Subjects," History and Theory, Beiheft 1(1961), 75-77.
"Index of Names," History and Theory, Beiheft 1 (1961), 78-87.
