Volume 17
Written By Elizabeth Boyle
ARTICLES
Arnaldo Momigliano, “Greek Historiography," History and Theory 17, no. 1 (1978), 1-28.
During the modern period, thinkers have asked two fundamental questions about Greek historiography. The first concerns the compatibility of Greek historiography with the Biblical vision of the world, and the second compares the Greek vision with modern historiographical views. The status of history was never clearly settled among the Greeks, though it never replaced or was accepted by Greek philosophy and religion. Greek historiography progressed from an essentially local, ethnographic, and mythological practice, to the more national concerns of war and politics. Greek history was not incompatible with Christian ethics. However, because human destiny was not its object, the Christian and modern moral questions about truth and value were not rigorously explored. In addition, the modern demands for proof and validity in the use of evidence were not fulfilled.
Allan Megill, “Aesthetic Theory and Historical Consciousness in the Eighteenth Century," History and Theory 17, no. 1 (1978), 29-62.
Eighteenth-century historiography was not, as Meinecke argued, "the substitution of a process of individualizing observation for a generalizing view of human forces in history." This generally accepted view involves a metaphysics which, though characteristic of nineteenth-century historicism, rejects the primarily contextual evaluation of eighteenth-century historicism. This underlying form of evaluation developed not with individualism, but with aesthetics. Though usually considered a product of the eighteenth century, aesthetic historicism can be traced to the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns, which began in the late 1680s and culminated with the "war over Homer" of 1714-1716. This argument explored the problem of evaluating the art of other historical ages. The implications of this position are that historicism was not an essentially German movement and that historicism was not a rigid antithesis to the Enlightenment.
Robert Anchor, “History and Play: Johan Huizinga and His Critics," History and Theory 17, no. 1 (1978), 63-93.
Johan Huizinga, in Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (1938), was the first to attempt to define play and its role in culture, politics, and warfare. Play, he stated, is an activity which exists outside serious life routines, but which immerses the individual totally within its unique boundaries of time and space. The motivation for play is fun rather than material profit. Critics questioned how the higher forms of cultural experience could be at once playful and serious as Huizinga had claimed. Jacques Ehrmann and Eugen Fink concluded that play is not an Urphänomen distinct from reality. Rather, it is symbolic re-enactment of the world in which men can at once become the subjects and the objects of their activity. We can learn the meaning of existence for a particular society from its play.
Allan R. Buss, “Critical Notice of Izenberg's ‘Psychohistory and Intellectual History,’" History and Theory 17, no. 1 (1978), 94-98.
Izenberg states that psychoanalysis should be used only for explaining irrational beliefs. This view of rationality, however, fails to acknowledge the content of rationality. The Frankfurt School of critical theory has argued that such substantive values as freedom and emancipation from domination may direct reason away from current social opinion. In addition, irrational thought may be masked by abstract, instrumental or technical rationality. This situation would be invisible if examined from Izenberg's ahistorical position. Izenberg also claims that irrational beliefs are independent of any logical process of deliberation. However, this prevents him from examining the truth or falsity of the content of a rational belief. His position supports both absolutist and relativist views which reinforce current ideas and reality. Izenberg offers no way of emancipating man from his present.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Gerhard Oestreich on The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze by Felix Gilbert and Robert M. Berdahl, History and Theory 17, no. 1 (1978), 99-112.
Charles Cohen on A New Language for Psychoanalysis by Roy Schafer, History and Theory 17, no. 1 (1978), 113-130.
Albert Rabil, Jr. on Existential Marxism in Postwar France. From Sartre to Althusser by Mark Poster, History and Theory 17, no. 1 (1978), 130-143.
ARTICLES
W. H. Dray, "Concepts of Causation in A. J. P. Taylor's Account of the Origins of the Second World War," History and Theory 17, no. 2 (1978), 149-174.
A. J. P. Taylor's book, The Origins of the Second World War, has generated substantial criticism from historians. However, Taylor and his critics agree on many aspects of causality. At least four models of the cause versus condition, argument can be discerned in the work of both Taylor and his critics. The first is the "traditional" theory that the war was caused by a single man, Adolf Hitler. A second issue concerns what it means to say that Hitler "intended" to take certain actions. The third is to what extent conditions forced the occurrence of particular events. The final conception of cause revealed is the notion of a condition which is sufficient to effect a result. Though Taylor seems to arrive at this position, he does not offer any opinion on the sufficient conditions themselves.
Sande Cohen, "Structuralism and the Writing of Intellectual History," History and Theory 17, no. 2 (1978), 175-206.
History is not the nature or foundation of knowledge, but is rather a language of cultural conventions concerning remembrances of the past. As a system of intellectual history, structuralism argues that historians do not consign meaning to texts of the past. The historians' practice, itself, introduces sense and logic into a past text before that text has meaning. Historical practice, then, presupposes culture. It can be understood by uncovering the linguistic rules which determine what structures and messages can count as historical knowledge. Ideas as different as those of Husserl and Wittgenstein, for example, share the common syntactical basis of philosophy. The primary question for history should not be "What did that mean?" but "How did that phenomenon qualify for a category called history and how has historical writing acquired discursive power?"
Baruch Fischhoff, "Intuitive use of Formal Models. A Comment on Morrison's ‘Quantitative Models in History,’" History and Theory 17, no. 2 (1978), 207-210.
Morrison attempted to disprove Arthur Schlesinger's analysis that Roosevelt's decision to pack the Supreme Court in 1937 could only be understood in qualitative terms. Morrison argued, rather, that at least one aspect of Roosevelt's decision, the vacancy of seats on the Supreme Court, behaved in accordance with the Poisson statistical distribution. However, this argument assumes that the probabilistic process itself had both memory and morality. Moreover, it assumes that individuals possess an understanding of statistical methods. Formal quantitative methods are usually narrow and not easily generalized. Despite the difficulties with Morrison's particular argument, informal quantitative methods or "rules of thumb" are frequently used in the decision-making process. A cautious application of informal heuristics can prove a useful tool for historical research.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Louis O. Mink on The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge by Maurice Mandelbaum, History and Theory 17, no. 2 (1978), 211-223.
Orest Ranum on Faire de L'Histoire by J. le Goff and P. Nora, History and Theory 17, no. 2 (1978), 223-228.
Myron P. Gilmore on History. Choice and Commitment by Felix Gilbert, History and Theory 17, no. 2 (1978), 228-235.
Eduard Rosenbaum on Penser la Guerre. Clausewitz. Volume I: L'Âge Européen by Raymond Aron and Penser la Guerre. Clausewitz. Volume II: L'Âge Planétaire by Raymond Aron, History and Theory 17, no. 2 (1978), 235-240.
J. L. Herkless on Für eine Erneuerte Historik. Studien zur Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft, Kultur und Gesellschaft by Jörn Rüsen, History and Theory 17, no. 2 (1978), 241-245.
ARTICLES
Stephen Bann, "Historical Text and Historical Object: The Poetics of the Musée de Cluny,” History and Theory 17, no. 3 (1978), 251-266.
An epistemological break occurred in historical discourse between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries; it is exemplified in the collections of Alexandre Lenoir and Alexandre du Sommerard in the Musée de Cluny. Foucault and later Hayden White identified this break as a transition from the classic to the romantic episteme. The classic eighteenth -century relationship between the historical object and the historical text tended to be reductionist and mechanistic while the nineteenth-century form was more integrated and organic. White treated these relations as modes of discourse and referred to their typological forms as tropes. He referred to the classic and romantic tropes as metonymy and synecdoche, respectively. Lenoir's "metonymic" collection includes as many objects of a period as possible within a space. Du Sommerard, on the other hand, displayed the objects "synecdochically" within a space designed not only to contain them, but to explain their role in the past.
C. Behan Mc Cullagh, "Colligation and Classification in History,” History and Theory 17, no. 3 (1978), 267-284.
W. H. Walsh argued that historians used colligatory terms to describe historical change, and defined such terms as those which relate a group of events by a common idea or value. The colligatory term identifies a general relationship among singular events. Events give concrete expression to the ideas shared by the people who initiated them. Thus, colligatory terms, such as "French Revolution," are always singular proper nouns, rather than general classifications. However, in addition to common ideas, colligatory terms are used to describe the form of the historical change. Terms like "revolution" and "renaissance" do convey meaning when applied generally. Colligatory terms, then, can relate formal structures as well as dispositional. attitudes, and can function both as general classifications and as singular entities.
James Farr, "Hume, Hermeneutics, and History: A ‘Sympathetic’ Account,” History and Theory 17, no. 3 (1978), 285-310.
Though Hume is often considered the hero of analytic philosophy in its positivistic phase, his concept of sympathy can be understood as an ei ghteenth- century prototype of Verstehen. Sympathy is central to Hume's moral philosophy, as he considered it the source of human motivation, social interaction, evaluation, and understanding. It has been acknowledged that sympathy, for Hume, was the human ability to associate with the sensations and passions of others. However, he also stated that this association was neither feeling nor passion, but a species of communication. This sympathetic communication included not only passions and feelings, but ideas, opinions, and reason. Though somewhat inconsistently, Hume argued that the process of sympathy was hermeneutic rather than causal. Like the concept of Verstehen, sympathy requires a contextual understanding of human relations.
Balkrishna Govind Gokhale, "Nehru and History,” History and Theory 17, no. 3 (1978), 311-322.
Though an increased historical awareness was among the new ideas comprising Indian nationalism, not all leaders shared the same perception of that past. Nehru had no single system of thought but his historical writings show the influence of both Marxist and liberal humanism. He adopted much of the Marxist rhetoric and used concepts such as the polarity of opposing forces. Nehru was concerned not with the role of individuals in history, but with the daily lives, values, and tradition of civilizations. He also considered economics the primary causal factor in history. Yet, Nehru had been heavily influenced by Gandhi and could not subscribe to the violence implicit in the Marxist resolution of conflict. He held mixed views on capitalism. Nehru understood its potential benefit to human welfare, but he also believed that it generates a decline in the spirit of a civilization far more destructive than foreign attack.
Richard Vernon, "Auguste Comte and ‘Development’: A Note,” History and Theory 17, no. 3 (1978), 323-326.
Comte is best known for his law of three states. According to this law, history necessarily develops through three stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific. However, the notion of "development" takes on three meanings within his works. First, he describes it as the unfolding of an inherent principle of growth analogous to the individual life process. Second, development is a causal sequence for organic growth. The individual's life is not the fulfillment of an immanent purpose but is the outcome of past achievements. Finally, Comte considered change a progressive elaboration through a variety of environments. Though history had an end, events are not a contingent sequence of steps toward that end, but are rather anticipations of it. Comte's paradigms of the process of secularization demonstrate the importance of these distinctions.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Karl Christ on Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography by Arnaldo Momigliano, History and Theory 17, no. 3 (1978), 327-336.
Susan James on Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences by Barry Hindess, History and Theory 17, no. 3 (1978), 336-349.
Vera Schwarcz on The Mozartian Historian. Essays on the Works of Joseph R. Levenson by Maurice Meisner and Rhoads Murphey, History and Theory 17, no. 3 (1978), 349-367.
Peter Hughes on L'Écriture de L'Histoire by Michel de Certeau, History and Theory 17, no. 3 (1978), 367-374.
Jean-Louis Flandrin on Family Life and Illicit Love in Earlier Generations by Peter Laslett, History and Theory 17, no. 3 (1978), 374-388.
Lothar Kettenacker on Ranke. The Meaning of History by Leonard Krieger, History and Theory 17, no. 3 (1978), 388-394.
Historical Consciousness and Political Action
Theodor Schieder, “The Role of Historical Consciousness in Political Action," History and Theory, Beiheft 17 (1978), 1-18.
Historical consciousness refers not only to a knowledge of the past but implies the use of that knowledge to understand the future. Many elements blur our perception of history as it regards current political action. It may cripple us with the realization of the relative inability of individuals to effect change. In addition, our memories of the past tend to be selective and short. We may remember falsity rather than truth. History, itself, may be used as evidence in the support of particular political positions merely for the benefit of a single group. Nonetheless, all of us are affected to some extent by the understanding of our historical traditions and in its best form this knowledge leads us from legend toward truth. The current trend to ignore historical education could prevent us from learning that the truth of the past forms the core of our knowledge of the future.
Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Social Conditioning and Social Relevance of Historical Judgments," History and Theory, Beiheft 17 (1978), 19-35.
The contribution of historical judgment to a rational world view can be understood only if it is assumed that the conceptual tools of an historian are, at least in part, culturally determined. The historian's cultural tools include his social self-image, and notions of past change and future development. Both the typological and the narrative forms of historical explanation are, in Hempel's terms, partial explanations which emphasize only selected causal relationships. Though these explanations do not meet Popper's and Nagel's standards of verification because they cannot be proven false, they can be verified intersubjectively. The extent and the integration of source material as well as the logical consistency of an explanation can be tested. Through a rational criticism of the assumptions underlying historical explanation, a society can also critically examine its assumptions about the present.
Karl-Georg Faber, “The Use of History in Political Debate," History and Theory, Beiheft 17 (1978), 19-35.
During the nineteenth century, writers of the historicist school argued that though knowledge of the past cannot be directly applied to daily problems, it is nevertheless indispensable for a true understanding of the present. In practice, however, both politicians and historians used historical arguments to support political positions. This is illustrated by a study of the use of history in the political debates over the Polish question (1848), the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), and the Ostverträge (1972). These debates illustrate three uses of historical evidence in policy arguments. The forms include the projected success or failure of a particular decision, the moral and legal implications of that decision, and the symbolic values which the decision reflected. There is, however, a fundamental contradiction between history and politics. While history must methodologically suspend normative premises, political decisions are founded upon the notion of a right distribution of power.
Cover image: Gothic vaults in the chapel of the Hôtel de Cluny, Paris, by NonOmnisMoriar (7 August 2011)
