Volume 21
Written By Elizabeth Boyle
ARTICLES
Norman Etherington, “Reconsidering Theories of Imperialism," History and Theory 21, no. 1 (1982), 1-36.
To test theories of economic imperialism by close historical study of colonial expansion in the late nineteenth century is a fundamental mistake. Lenin, Schumpeter, Luxemburg, Kautsky, and Hobson all argue that monopoly organization, protection, autocratic methods of government, and militarism are the inescapable companions of the use of state power to pursue economic objectives beyond the state frontier. Without this constellation of factors present, theories of imperialism do not obtain, and what is there is properly called colonialism. The unjustifiable extension of those theories - propounded between 1898 and 1919 for the specific purpose of explaining the behavior of developed nations in that era -to cover events long before and after that era has misdirected research.
Gordon Graham, “Can There be History of Philosophy?," History and Theory 21, no. 1 (1982), 37-52.
The understanding which a philosopher has, can have, or ought to have of the work of his predecessors cannot be historical in character. Collingwood is right about evidence and the nature of historical understanding. But what a philosopher wrote is not evidence of his thought, it is his thought. The ideas and doctrines of past philosophers are not themselves in the past and do not therefore belong to a special period of the past. Philosophic ideas cannot be said to be in time at all. Different interpretations of particular passages are strengthened or weakened by the citation of matters of historical fact, just as they may be by linguistic or literary knowledge. Such a clarification may enable us to resolve the question of the consistency of a passage with the rest of an author's work, but it does not destroy the philosophic character of the question.
Raymond Martin, “Causes, Conditions, and Causal Importance," History and Theory 21, no. 1 (1982), 53-74.
Judgments which assign relative importance to the causes of particular results can be objective. Historians usually do and can use a factual principle of selection to distinguish between causes and conditions and between more and less important causes. The judgments which distinguish between causes and conditions and the judgments which distinguish between more and less important causes require radically different analyses. In A. M. Jones's work on the decline and fall of Rome, he argued that increased barbarian pressure on the West was the most important cause of Rome's fall. It is possible to understand this statement as an instantiation of the following: A was a more important cause of P relative to 0 than was B if 1) A and B were each a cause of P relative to 0 and 2) either A was necessary for P or B was not necessary for P and 3) had B not occurred, something would have occurred which more closely approximates P than had A not occurred.
Leon Chai, “Remarks on the Development of Theoretical Structure in Nineteenth-Century Thought," History and Theory 21, no. 1 (1982), 75-82.
Theoretical structure cannot exist independently of content and thus cannot be developed by restricting analysis to discourse alone. Through analysis, content becomes theoretical structure and this becoming is its theoretical appearance. The need for content within theoretical structure is lost sight of in recent speculation on the history of thought by Derrida and Heidegger. Histories of nineteenth-century thought ought to make the development of theoretical structures rather than the structures themselves the object of analysis. Many nineteenth-century systems make the nature of theoretical structure identical with that of its content. This leads theoretical structure to become appearance. Many late nineteenth-century systems made becoming or force the content of a development of thought. To become theoretical structure, force would have to become something different from itself. A resulting theoretical structure can only be appearance.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Dominick LaCapra on The Political Unconscious. Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act by Fredric Jameson, History and Theory 21, no. 1 (1982), 83-106.
Lionel Gossman on Renan. Historien Philosophe by Harold W. Wardman, History and Theory 21, no. 1 (1982), 106-124.
Howard N. Tuttle on Wilhelm Dilthey. A Hermeneutic Approach to the Study of History and Culture by Ilse N. Bulhof, History and Theory 21, no. 1 (1982), 125-131.
Henry Abelove on The Poverty of Theory by E. P. Thompson, History and Theory 21, no. 1 (1982), 132-142.
Peter Stansky on Elie Halévy. An Intellectual Biography by Myrna Chase, History and Theory 21, no. 1 (1982), 132-142.
ARTICLES
Gary Shapiro, "Nietzsche Contra Renan," History and Theory 21, no. 2 (1982), 192-222.
Nietzsche's later view of history is a critique and parody of Renan's History of the Origins of Christianity. Nietzschean genealogy places into question both the person of the historian (and his or her readers) and the apparently innocent aestheticism of the contemplation of the past. History proceeds through the categories of shock, rupture, and scandal, not by Renan's sentimental continuity and evolution. Beneath every asserted continuity is the workings of priestly-philosophical power structures. Nietzsche hopes to free man from individual guilt through the myth of eternal recurrence, according to which events are so intertwined that none may be uniquely designated as cause (sinner) or effect (punishment). The issue here is between Renan's narrative view of reality and Nietzsche's nonnarrative view. Nietzsche's nonnarrative "life of Jesus" is really an attack on the narrative principle itself.
Michel-Marie Dufeil, "Histoire Classique, Histoire Critique: Reflexions sur le Texte et L'Objet," History and Theory 21, no. 2 (1982), 223-233.
Classical history concentrated on finding and making critiques of written texts. Critical history can now demonstrate the limitations of its notions both of "text" and of "critique." Rather than conceiving of history as starting with the invention of writing, we must now see writing itself as the result of a long historical process. We should treat written texts as objects; and at the same time see all the vestiges of the human past as texts. To decode these vestiges (including traces of the oral tradition as well as fossils, potsherds, etc.) methods similar to those of structural linguistics are required; and these show the configurations of words in a manner quite different from the quasi-mythological constructions of the late nineteenth century. History can now start again with written texts, but never treating these in isolation; for at the beginning, throughout, and to the end there are the object and the Word.
Christopher J. Berry, "Hume on Rationality in History and Social Life," History and Theory 21, no. 2 (1982), 234-247.
Like other Enlightenment thinkers, Hume provides a formal account of social life with a substantive theory of rationality. Hume has a noncontextualist theory of human nature. Human nature possesses certain constant and universal principles, the operation of which are unaffected by history of sociocultural contexts. Some social practices are more rational, more "in tune" with human nature, than others. Although Hume is resigned to the fact that customs are too deep-rooted to be eradicated, his theories of rationality and social life permit him to identify and censure superstition.
Warren Schmaus, "A Reappraisal of Comte's Three-State Law," History and Theory 21, no. 2 (1982), 248-266.
Comte's three-state law concerns the historical development (through the theological, metaphysical, and positive states) of our methods of cognitive inquiry. Comte believes he can defend his three-state law either by :,rational proofs" based upon our knowledge of the human mind or upon 'historical verifications." Comte then uses the three-state law of scientific progress to argue for the existence of industrial and multistate political laws of progress. Here Comte strays from his positivism. He attributes a kind of causal efficacy to scientific progress which leads him to look for laws of social dynamics describing the social progress which result from the scientific. Here Comte is guilty of Popper's "poverty of historicism" charge. Comte's three-state law of scientific development is more easily defended than his concept of historical method.
W. Paul Vogt, "Identifying Scholarly and Intellectual Communities: A Note on French Philosophy, 1900-1939," History and Theory 21, no. 2 (1982), 267-278.
By investigating the major scholarly and intellectual journals of a field, it is possible to discern the leading members of scholarly and intellectual communities. A quantitative examination of the two most important philosophy journals in the French Third Republic, Revue philosophique and Revue de métaphysique et de morale, confirms the long-suspected existence of a philosophical gerontocracy but shows that the philosophical establishment was preparing for a sharp turn in French philosophy and social thought. It also reveals that the establishment was overwhelmingly male but open to foreign influence. Quantitative studies cannot replace more qualitative work but they do help identify authors whose works ought to be read, and they do so historically and systematically.
REVIEW OF REVIEWS
Richard T. Vann, "The Youth of Centuries of Childhood, “ History and Theory 21, no. 2 (1982), 279-297.
Ariès's Centuries of Childhood initially was largely ignored by scholars and scholarly journals who could not locate the book within traditional disciplines. But the influence of the book grew steadily, and it has played a formative role in the history of the family and the histoire des mentalités. Ariès had three theses: that childhood was invented in the seventeenth century; that the invention of childhood arose from the dual impulses of parents to coddle their children and, along with schoolmasters, to pay greater attention to forming the children's characters through education; and that the concept of childhood led to an intense and pri~,atized mode of parent-child relations. The first thesis is the most dubious, but in the light of new research none of them seems likely to endure. A new interpretative framework will be required. Nonetheless, Ariès's work will endure in the history of historiography because he established the history of childhood as a field.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Georges May on Absorption and Theatricality. Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot by Michael Fried, History and Theory 21, no. 2 (1982), 298-306.
Alan Ryan on Political Obligation in Its Historical Context by John Dunn, History and Theory 21, no. 2 (1982), 306-314.
Alvin C. Kibel on The Veracious Imagination. Essays on American History, Literature, and Biography by Cushing Strout, History and Theory 21, no. 2 (1982), 315-320.
ARTICLES
Friedrich Rapp, "Structural Models in Historical Writing: The Determinants of Technological Development during the Industrial Revolution,” History and Theory 21, no. 3 (1982), 327-346.
The gap between the metatheoretical inquiries of the analytical philosophy of history, formulated in terms of general principle, and the actual research practices of the historical discipline needs to be bridged. This investigation of the determinants -preconditions, causes, factors, forces - of technological development during the Industrial Revolution makes explicit the range of theoretical instruments used in such studies. The methodologically unavoidable plurality of aspects and perspectives for each concrete inquiry precludes any generally binding model for technological development. Discussion of epistemological presuppositions, by comparing various approaches, can serve to make fully conscious these presuppositions and make them accessible to analysis and criticism.
Michael J. Maclean, "Johann Gustav Droysen and the Development of Historical Hermeneutics,” History and Theory 21, no. 3 (1982), 347-365.
Droysen sought to exploit, for practical political effect, a vision of history as an integral, progressive, and fathomable continuum, and hence in his writings subordinated historical individuality to history's discernible teleology. Droysen's methodological opponent, Rankean historicism, was to the right of his centrist politics. Droysen insisted against Ranke that history is not something "out there" that can be dispassionately and scientifically analyzed but is man's ontological ground. He was basically a moderate Young Hegelian: historians can be scholars and yet ally with and further the rational dynamism of history's normative Ideas because those Ideas are their own as progressive human beings. This battle between Ranke and Droysen illustrates that the evolution of German historical hermeneutics at mid-nineteenth century was generated both by a deep conflict within the German historical tradition and by the confrontation of that tradition with positivism.
Shaye J. D. Cohen, "Josephus, Jeremiah, and Polybius,” History and Theory 21, no. 3 (1982), 366-381.
Flavius Josephus was a Jewish priest who surrendered to the Romans in the first Jewish revolt and then spent the rest of the war trying to convince the Jews to surrender. After the war he wrote Jewish War to explain why he surrendered and why the Jews did not. Josephus explains the fall of Jerusalem by adopting and adapting a Jewish and a Greek response; the former Jeremiahic and the latter Polybian. Josephus to some extent was a Jeremiah and to some extent a Polybius, with the Jeremiahic element preponderant. Jeremiah and other Jews opposed to revolutions believed that God will redeem the Jews in his own way at his own time; meanwhile, the Jews should support their foreign overlords and maintain the peace.
Larry Shiner, "Reading Foucault: Anti-Method and the Genealogy of Power-Knowledge,” History and Theory 21, no. 3 (1982), 382-398.
Foucault's writing is best understood in terms of its political purpose and of the political question it puts to philosophy, history, and the human sciences. Foucault is not looking for a "method" which will be superior to other methods in objectivity but is forging tools of analysis which take their starting point in the political-intellectual conflicts of the present. His method is really an antimethod, "genealogy," which seeks to free us from the illusion that an apolitical method is possible. A genealogy of the human sciences examines the intimate connection of the knowledge they represent with the relations of power which produced them. Such a genealogy shows how the human sciences emerged from the tactics or microtechnologies of power by which various groups and individuals attempted to give structure to the field of behavior of others, seeking to increase the economic utility of the body while decreasing its political danger. Genealogy attempts to restore the "subjugated" knowledge of the patient, the prisoner, the worker.
REVIEW ESSAYS
James P. Carse on The Hour of Our Death by Philippe Ariès and Helen Weaver, History and Theory 21, no. 3 (1982), 399-410.
James M. Banner, Jr. on Social History and Social Policy by David J. Rothman and Stanton Wheeler, History and Theory 21, no. 3 (1982), 410-416.
Robert Anchor on Sozialgeschichte der Aufklärung in Frankreich by H. U. Gumbrecht, R. Reichardt, and T. Schleich, History and Theory 21, no. 3 (1982), 416-424.
John H. Hallowell on The Philosophy of Order. Essays on History, Consciousness and Politics by Peter J. Opitz and Gregor Sebba and Eric Voegelin. Philosopher of History by Eugene Webb, History and Theory 21, no. 3 (1982), 426-429.
New Paths of Classicism in the Nineteenth Century
Arnaldo Momigliano
“Introduction," History and Theory, Beiheft 21 (1982), 1-2.
“Niebuhr and the Agrarian Problems of Rome," History and Theory, Beiheft 21 (1982), 3-15.
The sharp distinction between right of private ownership and right of occupation as formulated by Barthold Niebuhr in 1810-1811 has ever since been the center of discussion, interpretation, and doubt in any comparison between Roman property law and other legal systems. Fearful of the establishment of a modern agrarian law by contemporary radicals, he tried to prove that the Romans had never used agrarian laws to undermine the private ownership of land. Niebuhr hoped to separate what he considered the just claims of agrarian reforms from the unjust attacks against private property. Niebuhr's acquaintance with the Indian agrarian situation enabled him to understand the real nature of the ager publicus Jin Rome. A conservative, Niebuhr hoped to save the aristocracy from itself; an outsider in aristocratic society by virtue of his peasant ancestry, he was sympathetic to the peasantry as well.
“From Mommsen to Max Weber," History and Theory, Beiheft 21 (1982), 16-32.
In 1856, Mommsen responded to the increased interest in primitive German communism sparked by Marx and Engels by showing that the early Romans did not lag behind the early Germans in their collective attitudes. Fustel managed to have the property structure of the Roman gens as the archetype of primitive private property; whereas Mommsen, Maine, and Bonfante identified the gens with the primitive communist village. This was possible because we know little about the nature and function of the early Roman gens. Compared to these writers, Weber was much more interested in historical times than in the origins of private ownership in Rome. Where Mommsen saw the origins of Roman civilization in the fight of sturdy peasants to keep their own fields, Weber depicted these same Rornans at a later stage where they had degenerated into greedy landowners and were prepared to separate themselves from the cities they had created.
“Hermann Usener," History and Theory, Beiheft 21 (1982), 33-48.
Usener's use of philology and more specifically of comparative philology for the transformation of the study of religion during the late nineteenth century resulted from a slow realization of certain potentialities of philology which he and others had not grasped before. When Usener aimed at a definite and systematic examination of pagan elements in Christianity, with the ultimate purpose of preparing their elimination from modern Christianity, he made the decisive move from what we would call the humanistic tradition of the textual critic and interpreter to the task of the philological - and by implication antitheological - interpreter of religion. An interpretation of Usener in terms of a modified Kantian problematic about the relation between phenomenon and noumenon would show that Usener struggled to find in human language the channel toward the Noumenon.
“Religious History without Frontiers: J. Wellhausen, U. Wilamowitz, and E. Schwartz," History and Theory, Beiheft 21 (1982), 49-64.
Wellhausen, Usener, Wilamowitz, and Schwartz found common presuppositions in a philological method which relied on the instrument of text analysis and avoided any theological or dogmatic interference. Wellhausen became a hero to Wilamowitz and Schwartz because he showed them that the same method was legitimate both in sacred and profane texts. He also confirmed them in what they had already learned from Usener: that repudiation of theological presuppositions did not mean absence of religious emotions. But Wellhausen, Wilamowitz, and Schwartz had in common political emotions which were alien to the contemplative Usener.
Cover image: Untitled, by Jossuha Théophile (13 May 2019)
