Volume 38
Written By Elizabeth Boyle
ARTICLES
Perez Zagorin, “History, the Referent, and Narrative: Reflections on Postmodernism Now," History and Theory 38, no. 1 (1999), 1-24.
This essay surveys the present position of postmodernism with respect to the effect of its ideas upon historiography. For this purpose it looks at a number of writings by historians that have been a response to postmodernism including the recently published collection of articles, The Postmodern History Reader. The essay argues that, in contrast to scholars in the field of literary studies, the American historical profession has been much more resistant to postmodernist doctrines and that the latters' influence upon the thinking and practice of historians is not only fading but increasingly destined to fade. The essay also presents a critical discussion of the current philosophy of postmodernism in its bearing upon historiography, directed chiefly against its claim that the world has undergone an epochal transition from the modern to a postmodern age; its theory of language and linguistic idealism; its opposition to historical realism and denial of the actuality of the past as a possible object of reference; and its theory of historical narrative as unconstrained fictional construction. This discussion includes a consideration of the work of postmodernist thinkers such as J.-F. Lyotard, of the recent books by David Roberts and Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr. which espouse a postmodernist theory of history, and of the narrativist theory of Hayden White. The essay also notes some of the reasons for postmodernism's appeal; and while it does not deny that postmodernist philosophy may have served a useful purpose in provoking historians to be more self-critical and aware of their presuppositions and procedures, it maintains that its skeptical and politicized view of historical inquiry is deeply mistaken, out of accord with the way historians themselves think about their work, and incapable of providing an understanding of historiography as a form of thought engaged in the attainment of knowledge and understanding of the human past.
FORUM ON COMPARATIVE HISTORIOGRAPHY
Chris Lorenz, “Comparative Historiography: Problems and Perspectives," History and Theory 38, no. 1 (1999), 25-39.Just like history, historiography is usually written and analyzed within one spatio-temporal setting, traditionally that of a particular nation-state. As a consequence, historiography tends to localize explanations for historiographical developments within national contexts and to neglect international dimensions. As long as that is the case, it is impossible to assess the general and specific aspects of historiographical case studies. This forum, therefore, represents a sustained argument for comparative approaches to historiography.First, my introduction takes a recent study in Canadian historiography as a point of departure in order to illustrate the problems of non-comparative historiography. These problems point to strong arguments in favor of comparative approaches. Second, I place comparative historiography as a genre in relation to a typology that orders theories of historiography on a continuum ranging from general and philosophical to particular and empirical. Third, I put recent debates on the "fragmentation" of historiography in a comparative perspective. Worries among historians about this fragmentation-usually associated with the fragmentation of the nation and the advent of multiculturalism and/or postmodernism-are legitimate when they concern the epistemological foundations of history as a discipline. As soon as the "fragmentation" of historiography leads to-and is legitimated by-epistemological skepticism, a healthy pluralism has given way to an unhealthy relativism. As comparison puts relativism in perspective by revealing its sociohistorical foundations, at the same time it creates its rational antidote. Fourth, I summarize the contributions to this forum; all deal-directly or indirectly-with the historiography of the Second World War. Jürgen Kocka's "Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg" examines the so-called "special path" of Germany's history. Daniel Levy's "The Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing Memories in Germany and Israel" offers a comparative analysis of recent historiographical debates in Germany and Israel. Sebastian Conrad's "What Time is Japan? Problems of Comparative (Intercultural) Historiography" analyzes the conceptual linkage between Japanese historiography and specific interpretations of European history. Richard Bosworth's "Explaining 'Auschwitz' after the End of History: The Case of Italy" charts in a comparative perspective the changes since 1989 in Italian historiography concerning fascism. All four articles support the conclusion that next to the method of historical comparison is the politics of comparison, which is hidden in the choice of the parameters. Analyses of both method and politics are essential for an understanding of (comparative) historiography.
Jürgen Kocka, “Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg," History and Theory 38, no. 1 (1999), 40-50.Frequently, historical comparisons are asymmetrical in the sense that they investigate one case carefully while limiting themselves to a mere sketch of the other case(s) which serve(s) as comparative reference point(s). The debate on the German Sonderweg (special path) and the rich historical literature originating from this debate can serve as examples. This article reconstructs the pros and cons within this controversial debate, reports its results and puts it into a broader historical context. It analyzes the comparative logic implied by the Sonderweg thesis and argues that the interpretation of modern German history in the sense of a Sonderweg can only be maintained if related to the question why Germany turned fascist and totalitarian in the interwar period while other (comparable) societies did not, and if Western countries are selected as units of comparison. The choice of comparative reference points turns out to be decisive and partly dependent on normative priorities and conventions. The article points to dangers and opportunities inherent in asymmetrical comparison.
Daniel Levy, “The Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing Memories in Germany and Israel," History and Theory 38, no. 1 (1999), 51-66.During the last two decades, a surge of historical revisionism has commanded considerable attention in both academia and the public sphere, as historians have linked their understandings of the past to salient problems and identity crises of the present. Increasingly, the histories of nations have been problematized and have become the object of commemorative battles. Historiographical disputes thus reveal no less about contemporary political sensibilities than they do about a nation's history. This article situates the proliferation of historical revisionism within the context of ongoing negotiations regarding the meaning of the nation at the end of the twentieth century. Through a comparison of recent historians' disputes in Germany and Israel, I explore the relationship between revisionism and collective memory, and the ways in which both are reflective of and contribute to the reformation of national identification. While national identities are usually predicated on continuities with the past, new German and Israeli identities are being defined in opposition to the founding myths of their nation-states. Both are continuously reassessing their pasts, negotiating the balance between a commitment to universal (democratic) values and the persistence of particularistic (ethnic) traditions. To be sure, national pasts have been contested before, but until recently the primacy of the nation itself was not significantly challenged. I suggest understanding the ongoing phenomenon of national demystification in the context of changing state–society relations. States no longer enjoy the same hegemonic power over the means of collective commemoration. In contrast to the state-supportive role of historians during the formative phase of nationalism, collective memory has become an increasingly contested terrain. In both countries, revisionists from the left and right self-consciously struggle to provide historical narratives of their nation's past to suit their present political views of the future.
Sebastian Conrad, “What Time is Japan? Problems of Comparative (Intercultural) Historiography," History and Theory 38, no. 1 (1999), 67-83.Rather than reflect on the process of an alleged "modernization" of historical scholarship, an intercultural comparison of historiography should take the European origins of academic history as its starting point. The reason, as this article argues, is that in non-European countries the European genealogy of the discipline of history continued to structure interpretations of the past. Both on the level of method, but more importantly on the level of interpretive strategies, "Europe" remained the yardstick for historiographical explanation. This article will use the example of postwar Japanese historiography to show that historians resorted to a European model in order to turn seemingly unconnected events in the Japanese past into a historical narrative. This is not to imply, however, that Japanese historiography passively relied on concepts from Western discourse. On the contrary, Japanese historians appropriated and transformed the elements of this discourse in the specific geopolitical setting of the 1940s and 1950s. This act of appropriation served the political purpose of positioning Japan with respect to Asia and the "West." However, on an epistemological level, the priority of "Europe" persisted; Japanese historiography remained a "derivative discourse." Studies in comparative historiography, therefore, should be attentive to these traces of the European descent of academic history and privilege the transnational history of historiography over meditations on its internal rationalization.
R. J. B. Bosworth, “Explaining ‘Auschwitz’ after the End of History: The Case of Italy," History and Theory 38, no. 1 (1999), 84-99.Everywhere the 1990s have been characterized by an odd mixture of ideological triumphalism-Fukuyama's "end of history" being only the crassest example-and of ideological uncertainty-can there be, should there be, a "third way"? For all its pretensions to universality, the "New World Order" has never lost a fragility in appearance. Students of historiography can scarcely be surprised to learn that an uneasiness over the present and future has in turn frequently entailed uncertainty about the past and particularly about those parts of the past which had seemed most able to give clear and significant "lessons." One evident example is the history of what in my Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima (1993) I called the "long" Second World War, that is, that crisis in confidence in the relationship between political and economic liberalism and the nation-state which, by the end of 1938, had left only Britain, France, the Low Countries, and Scandinavia as in any sense preserving those "liberal" freedoms which had spread across Europe since 1789. In this article, I briefly review the most recent difficulties World War II combatant societies have had in locating a usable past in the history of those times. However, my major focus is on the specific case of Italy, very much a border state in the Cold War system, and today the political home of an "Olive Tree" and a "Liberty Pole" whose historical antecedents and whose philosophical base for the future are less than limpid. 1990s Italian historians thus give very mixed messages about the Fascist past; these are the messages I describe and decode.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Brad S. Gregory on The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life by Alf Lüdtke and William Templer and Jeux D'Échelles. La Micro-Analyse à L'Expérience by Jacques Revel, History and Theory 38, no. 1 (1999), 100-110.
Robert Anchor on Konstruktion der Vergangenheit: Eine Einführung in die Geschichtstheorie by Chris Lorenz, Annegret Böttner, and Jorn Rusen, History and Theory 38, no. 1 (1999), 111-121.
Carolyn Dean on Queer Fictions of the Past: History, Culture, and Difference by Scott Bravmann, History and Theory 38, no. 1 (1999), 122-131.
John Passmore on The What and the Why of History: Philosophical Essays by Leon J. Goldstein, History and Theory 38, no. 1 (1999), 132-139.
ARTICLES
Johannes Bulhof, "What If? Modality and History," History and Theory 38, no. 2 (1999), 145-168.
Philosophers and historians have long been suspicious of modal and counterfactual claims. I argue, however, that historians often legitimately use modal and counterfactual claims for a variety of purposes. They help identify causes, and hence help explain events in history. They are used to defend judgments about people, and to highlight the importance of particular events. I defend these uses of modal claims against two arguments often used to criticize modal reasoning, using the philosophy of science to ground the truth of modal claims. This analysis puts several important points into perspective, including how certain we can be about our claims about what might have been, and the role that determinism plays in those claims. The proper analysis of modality shows, I argue, that counterfactual claims are legitimate and important, if often uncertain, and that issues of determinism are irrelevant to the modal claims used in historical analysis.
Joseph Fracchia, "Dialectical Itineraries," History and Theory 38, no. 2 (1999), 169-197.
This essay is a kind of sequel to an earlier one entitled "Marx's Aufhebung of Philosophy and the Foundations of a Historical-Materialist Science." Departing from the point reached in that essay, I take a Whitmanesque journey through Marx's writings and the logic of a materialist conception of history. I begin with Walt Whitman's very materialist, very dialectical, and very decentered apostrophe in his Song of the Open Road: "You objects that call forth from diffusion my meanings / And give them shape." Taking this apostrophe as my cue, I proceed to elaborate the complexity and the dimensions of dialectical thinking within a historical-materialist framework. The specific purpose of the essay is twofold: to portray the "decentered" dialectical methodology follows from Marx's historical-materialist redefinition of the subject-object relation; and to map the kinds of analytical tasks, the open-ended "itineraries," that a historical-materialist science of Wissenschaft must pursue. This "dialectical cartography" is developed through a critical and hopefully productive response to poststructuralist critiques of dialectics, particularly to those approaches that exaggerate Saussure's notion of the arbitrariness of signs. In this respect my intention is to indicate how the current confrontational relation between historical materialism and poststructuralism, especially over matters of the production of meaning and the analysis of culture, might be transformed intoone of complementarity.
Jerzy Topolski, "The Role of Logic and Aesthetics in Constructing Narrative Wholes in Historiography," History and Theory 38, no. 2 (1999), 198-210.
The construction of narrative wholes in historiography involves more than logic, but aesthetics as well. It is imagination as well as logic which generates the more or less concretized images constituting the background onto which the historian, "playing" with basic information, imposes some content and portrays some event by means of a narrative. These concretized images incorporate an aesthetic sense of order. Historical narratives also employ general terms which "bind together" the various elements of basic information which, when linked together, form a historical narrative; these general concepts also invoke an aesthetic sense in virtue of which their identity is formed. In both these ways the aesthetic dimension is crucial in the formation of historical wholes.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Stephen P. Turner on The Construction of Social Reality by John R. Searle, History and Theory 38, no. 2 (1999), 211-231.
Bruce Mazlish on Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies by Jared Diamond and The Structure of Big History: From the Big Bang until Today by Fred Spier, History and Theory 38, no. 2 (1999), 232-248.
Paul A. Roth on The Logic of Historical Explanation by Clayton Roberts, History and Theory 38, no. 2 (1999), 249-263.
Aviezer Tucker on Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals by Niall Ferguson, History and Theory 38, no. 2 (1999), 264-276.
ARTICLES
FORUM ON STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN HISTORICAL CAUSATION
David F. Lindenfeld, "Causality, Chaos Theory, and the End of the Weimar Republic: A Commentary on Henry Turner's Hitler's Thirty Days to Power,” History and Theory 38, no. 3 (1999), 281-299.This article seeks to integrate the roles of structure and human agency in a theory of historical causation, using the fall of the Weimar Republic and in particular Henry Turner's book Hitler's Thirty Days to Power as a case study. Drawing on analogies from chaos theory, it argues that crisis situations in history exhibit sensitive dependence on local conditions, which are always changing. This undermines the distinction between causes and conditions (including counterfactual conditions). It urges instead a distinction between empowering and constraining causes of specific human actions as a more fruitful model. The paper also discusses more briefly two other analogies to chaos theory: 1) similarity across differences in scale as applicable to different levels of individual (psychological) and collective events, which are seen as homologous; 2) a model of branching as applicable to the totality of causes of a given event.
Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., "Human Agency and Impersonal Determinants in Historical Causation: A Response to David Lindenfeld,” History and Theory 38, no. 3 (1999), 300-306.Lindenfeld's proposed reclassification of causes-offered in lieu of a chaos theory applicable to history-yields paradoxical results when applied to the developments that installed Hitler in power, since these would have to rank as "constraining" rather than "empowering" because of his lack of control over them. The "principle of sensitive dependence," while an admirable aspiration, proves a counsel of perfection beyond reach of the historian when applied to those same events. As to historical explanations in terms of structural, impersonal determinants, these remain ascendant, to the neglect of human agency. Narrative history, which alone can account for both remote and immediate causes, continues to be unfashionable. Explanations in terms of structures and impersonal forces, which can only imply causation, are attractive because they offer historians wide scope for exercise of erudition and arrive at determinants that appear larger and more powerful than mere actions of humans. Where profound developments are to be explained, such interpretations conform to the assumption that their causes must have been profound. Yet countless turning-points in history, including Hitler's installation in power, were decisively shaped by acts of a few persons. The frustrating difficulty of accounting for individual behavior contributes to the appeal of impersonal, structural explanations. These tend, however, toward a deterministic view of the past which awakens the impression that what happened had to happen. That obscures the openness of past situations and rules out assignment of personal responsibility to individuals, who seem mere pawns of forces beyond their control. A remedy for such deterministic tendencies lies in counterfactual analysis, which, by drawing attention to feasible, but unrealized, alternatives to what happened, can convey the open-ended qualities of past situations and the importance of contingency.
Roy W. Perrett, "History, Time, and Knowledge in Ancient India,” History and Theory 38, no. 3 (1999), 307-321.
The lack of interest in history in ancient India has often been noted and contrasted with the situation in China and the West. Notwithstanding the vast body of Indian literature in other fields, there is a remarkable dearth of historical writing in the period before the Muslim conquest and an associated indifference to historiography. Various explanations have been offered for this curious phenomenon, some of which appeal to the supposed currency of certain Indian philosophical theories. This essay critically examines such "philosophical explanations." I argue that it is not true that there was no history in ancient India, and it is not surprising that there was no developed historiography or scientific history. It is both true and surprising that there was no real importance attached to history in ancient India. An adequate philosophical explanation for this historical phenomenon, however, is not to be found in appeals to the influence of indigenous metaphysical theories about time and the self. A much more plausible philosophical explanation appeals instead to certain features of classical Indian epistemology.
Elías Palti, "The ‘Metaphor of Life’: Herder's Philosophy of History and Uneven Developments in Late Eighteenth-Century Natural Sciences,” History and Theory 38, no. 3 (1999), 322-347.
The origins of the evolutionary concept of history have normally been associated with the development of an organicist notion of society. The meaning of this notion, in turn, has been assumed as something perfectly established and clear, almost self-evident. This assumption has prevented any close scrutiny of it. As this article tries to show, the idea of "organism" that underlies the emergence of the evolutionary concept of history, far from being "self-evident," has an intricate history and underwent a number of radical and successive redefinitions from the mid-eighteenth century up to approximately 1830 (the heyday of Romanticism and the period in which the first modern "philosophies of history" took form). More specifically, this paper traces some of these transformations in order to contextualize and shed some new light on Herder's philosophy of history and the complex process of its inception-a process that was not concluded by the end of his intellectual career. As the article shows, Herder did not actually succeed in solving some key problems involved in an evolutionary concept of history. The difficulties he found were analogous to those that emerged at that very moment in the development of a dynamic, ontogenetical theory (that is, a theory of the embryo's transformation), and both were ultimately linked to the combination of some uneven developments produced in the natural sciences of that time. Herder's philosophy of history thus appears as a paradoxical (and highly unusual, seen from a epistemological point of view) case of a system of thought that formulates problems which it is still radically unable to solve, lacking the tools to devise a possible solution for them.
REVIEW ESSAYS
John E. Toews on Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Explanatory Schemes in History by Thomas L. Haskell, History and Theory 38, no. 3 (1999), 348-364.
David Carr on Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future by David Cockburn, History and Theory 38, no. 3 (1999), 365-377.
Daniel Gordon on The Killing of History: How Literary Critics and Social Theorists Are Murdering Our Past by Keith Windschuttle, History and Theory 38, no. 3 (1999), 378-388.
William R. Pinch on Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India by Bernard S. Cohn and Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 by Christopher A. Bayly, History and Theory 38, no. 3 (1999), 389-407.
The Return of Science: Evolutionary Ideas and History
David Gary Shaw, “The Return of Science," History and Theory, Theme Issue 38 (1999), 1-9.
Albert F. H. Naccache, “A Brief History of Evolution," History and Theory, Theme Issue 38 (1999), 10-32.
This paper presents a non-reductionist framework of eight nested modes of evolution that have successively emerged to organize the reproduction of all organisms, from the blue-green algae to our societies. The processes of biological, "Darwinian," evolution are those of drift during reproduction, and of selection. The key unit of evolutionary time is the generation, and its locus is the organisms' life-cycle setup. Different life-cycle setups support different mechanisms of reproduction, and therefore different modes of evolution. By tracing the different life-cycle setups attested throughout Life's History, we are able to characterize the successive modes of evolution with which they are associated. The present attempt has led to a characterization of the following eight nested modes of evolution: Basic; Reptilian; Archaic Mammalian; Progressive Mammalian; Socio-cultural; Extrasomatically Enhanced Socio-cultural; Tinkering; and finally Para-biological. These successively emerging modes govern a progressively reduced number of life-forms. The first four modes are "Darwinian" in the strict sense. The fifth, or socio-cultural mode, which governs whale and elephant societies in addition to hominoids, is already not "Darwinian" in the traditional sense. The last three modes have emerged with the genus homo, through the progressive extension of its life-cycle setups. The present framework is to be used heuristically, as a prism with which to separate the evolutionary spectrum of the constituent elements of human behavior. An example of such a behavioral evolutionary spectrum is presented in the conclusion, and is used to compare the present framework with those recently proposed by Maynard Smith and Szathmáry and by Foley.
Martin Stuart-Fox, “Evolutionary Theory of History," History and Theory, Theme Issue 38 (1999), 33-51.
Several attempts have been made recently to apply Darwinian evolutionary theory to the study of cultural change and social history. The essential elements in such a theory are variable components and their selective retention during the processes of replication and transmission. Location of these component "units" in the semantic structure of cognition provides the individual psychological basis for an evolutionary theory of history. Selection operates on both the level of cognition and on its "phenotypic" expression in action in relation to individual preferred sources of psychological satisfaction. Social power comprises the principal selective forces within the sociocultural environment. Sociocultural evolution takes place both as a result of the unintended consequences of action and through the struggle of individuals and groups in pursuit of opposing interests. The implications for historiography are methodological in that evolutionary theory of history sharpens the focus of explanatory situational analysis, and interpretive in that it provides a new metanarrative for the understanding of historical change.
Joseph Fracchia and R. C. Lewontin, “Does Culture Evolve? " History and Theory, Theme Issue 38 (1999), 52-78.
The drive to describe cultural history as an evolutionary process has two sources. One from within social theory is part of the impetus to convert social studies into "social sciences" providing them with the status accorded to the natural sciences. The other comes from within biology and biological anthropology in the belief that the theory of evolution must be universal in its application to all functions of all living organisms. The social scientific theory of cultural evolution is pre-Darwinian, employing a developmental model of unfolding characterized by intrinsic directionality, by definable stages that succeed each other and by some criterion of progress. It is arbitrary in its definitions of progress and has had the political problem that a diachronic claim of cultural progress implies a synchronic differential valuation of present-day cultures. The biological scheme creates an isomorphism between the Darwinian mechanism of evolution and cultural history, postulating rules of cultural "mutation", cultural inheritance and some mechanism of natural selection among cultural alternatives. It uses simplistic ad hoc notions of individual acculturation and of the differential survival and reproduction of cultural elements. It is unclear what useful work is done by substituting the metaphor of evolution for history.
Doyne Dawson, “Evolutionary Theory and Group Selection: The Question of Warfare," History and Theory, Theme Issue 38 (1999), 79-100.
Evolutionary anthropology has focused on the origins of war, or rather ethnocentricity, because it epitomizes the problem of group selection, and because war may itself have been the main agent of group selection. The neo-Darwinian synthesis in biology has explained how ethnocentricity might evolve by group selection, and the distinction between evoked culture and adopted culture, suggested by the emerging synthesis in evolutionary psychology, has explained how it might be transmitted. Ethnocentric mechanisms could have evolved by genetic selection in ancestral hominids, or through the interaction of genetic and cultural selection in modern humans, or both. The existence of similar behaviors in chimpanzees and the parallel development of early human societies around the globe are arguments for such inherited mechanisms. There may have been some adaptive breakthroughs in purely cultural evolution, but this process does not seem likely to produce long-term Darwinian adaptations because of the prolificity of cultural traits. Warfare may once have been a major agent of group selection, but the rates of extinction among human groups are so slow as to render this improbable since the rise of state-level societies, whose warfare tends to become a cyclical balance-of-power situation. Perhaps the most serious implication of current evolutionary thought is that the individualistic model of culture common in the social sciences and humanities is outmoded, and should be replaced by a new model that recognizes the organismic nature of human societies.
Alonso Peña, “On the Role of Mathematical Biology in Contemporary Historiography," History and Theory, Theme Issue 38 (1999), 101-120.
This essay proposes that mathematical biology can be used as a fruitful exemplar for the introduction of scientific principles to history. After reviewing the antecedents of the application of mathematics to biology, in particular evolutionary biology, I describe in detail a mathematical model of cultural diffusion based on an analogy with population genetics. Subsequently, as a case study, this model is used to investigate the dynamics of the early modern European witch-crazes in Bavaria, England, Hungary and Finland. In the second part of the article, I sketch the methodological significance of this type of 'scientific history' and, in particular, I identify three lessons that mathematical biology can contribute to historiography. The first lesson is on the fundamental distinction between agent's purposes and structural social processes. I argue that mathematical modeling can be fruitfully applied to describe social processes, while agents' purposes ought to be addressed following an hermeneutic tradition. The second lesson is on the aim of mathematical modeling. Here I argue that the object of modeling, rather than being the prediction or retrodiction of events (a deductive-nomological approach), is the understanding of the factors involved in the dynamics of social processes (an analytic-descriptive approach). Finally, the third lesson is on the new understanding of science after the collapse of the standard view. In summary, while mathematical modeling can provide an extremely powerful approach to clarify the dynamics of certain macro-historical processes, scientific methods ought to be regarded as a complement, not a substitute, to classical historiography.
Stephan Berry, “On the Problem of Laws in Nature and History: A Comparison," History and Theory, Theme Issue 38 (1999), 121-137.
In the philosophy of science there has traditionally been a tendency to regard physics as the incarnation of science per se. Accordingly, the status of other disciplines is evaluated then with respect to their ability to produce laws resembling those of physics. This view has yielded a considerable bias in the discussion of historical laws. Philosophers as well as historians have tended to discuss such laws mostly with reference to the situation in physics; this often led to either one of two conclusions, namely that (1) history is epistemologically completely separated from natural science, because it does not have universal laws, or that (2) the ultimate goal of the study of history must be the formulation of such universal laws. I would maintain that neither conclusion is necessary. To substantiate this position, aspects of laws in nature are discussed. One aspect being often neglected is the fact that there are many cases of statistical laws in nature; there is no close link between laws and determinism. Moreover, there are natural systems which have a history, i.e. systems which are, like human history, shaped by irreversible, singular events. One important case is biological evolution and accordingly I discuss the relation between evolutionary theory and historiography. However, since we are part of the living world, one could also ask whether the laws of evolution are of direct relevance for understanding our history, in addition to the methodological similarities between the two fields. This issue of history as evolution is being investigated in detail in the final section of the paper.
Donald E. Brown, “Human Nature and History," History and Theory, Theme Issue 38 (1999), 138-157.
What motivated British colonialism? What motivated renaissance Florentines to finance their state? Why did Brazilian men find mixed-race women so attractive? What promotes falsity in reports of human affairs? Why did historical mindedness develop in ancient Greece and China but not India? When homosexual communities developed, why did gay men pursue sexual strategies so different from those of lesbians? Why does a Heian-period Japanese description of fear of snakes sound so familiar to a Westerner? Why have rebels tended to be youngest rather than eldest siblings? To each of these (and many other) questions part of the answer lies in specific, identifiable features of human nature. Thus human nature is and should be a subtantial concern to anyone trying to understand the past. But human nature is also an object of scientific study. This paper explores a portion of this convergence of humanistic and scientific concerns by outlining and illustrating interrelations between human nature and history. Exploration of the interrelations between history and human nature requires a detailed understanding of what human nature is. And whatever human nature may be, it is a product of human evolution. Accordingly, key concepts in evolutionary psychology are presented to provide theoretical tools for understanding the centerpiece of human nature, the human mind. As much as the study of history may benefit from an understanding of human nature, the study of history and the use of historical materials may also promote the scientific study of human nature. Examples are given and several suggestions are presented to forward this task. Finally, an argument is made for a sort of back engineering in which historical events and conditions are traced to the specific features of human nature that motivated, facilitated, or shaped them. Insofar as this task is achieved, it closes the gap between recorded history and evolutionary history, between the humanities and the sciences.
Cover image: Photograph of Silicon Carbide, by USGS (20 March 2020)
