Volume 8
Written By Elizabeth Boyle
ARTICLES
Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969), 3-53.
Emphasis on autonomy of texts presupposes that there are perennial concepts. But researchers' expectations (or paradigms that influence them) may turn history into mythology of ideas; researchers forget that an agent cannot be described as doing something he could not understand as a description, and that thinking may be inconsistent. They will never uncover voluntary oblique strategies and by treating ideas as units will confuse sentences with statements. On the other hand, a contextual approach to the meaning of texts dismisses ideas as unimportant effects. Neither method shows how what was said was meant is crucial for understanding. There are no perennial problems; philosophers of different times do not speak directly to us. But history of ideas helps us recognize the contingency of many of our beliefs.
A. R. Louch, "History as Narrative," History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969), 54-70.
Narrative as it is used by historians is not merely an incidental, stylistic feature of the historian's craft, but essential to historical explanation. Narrative presupposes a world of things that endure through change. Stories fill in the gaps in our experience and thus make continuity visible. Ideally, narrative stands proxy for experience, though this ideal can never be attained. No criterion can be formulated that will signify when a story is complete enough. The changing perspective of the historian and the infinite detail with which he has to deal makes his task a continuous one. Yet the historian cannot be radically subjective because his story is always limited by the chronology of his events and the accuracy of his details. The rationale of narrative enables the historian to repudiate the covering-law model of historical explanation.
David P. Jordan, "Gibbon's 'Age of Constantine' and the Fall of Rome," History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969), 71-96.
Gibbon had more difficulty dealing with the age of Constantine than with any other period of Roman history. In the tradition of Enlightenment historiography, Gibbon was a philosophic historian, one who strove for interpretative and significant history. For Gibbon the age of Constantine was one of those crucial eras when civilization changed its direction. He was convinced that the growth of Christianity was a principal cause of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire and saw in the career of Constantine a microcosm of this process. In order to indict Christianity and prove Rome's fall in moral terms, Gibbon never actually distorted the facts, but he arranged the evidence, especially that referring to the date of Constantine's conversion, to support his novel interpretation.
Fritz Wagner, "Church History and Secular History as Reflected by Newton and His Time," History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969), 97-111.
Under the impact of twentieth-century catastrophes, historians are realizing that the disciplines of church and secular history have a transcendental point of reference. These two disciplines, separated during the dissolution of the old res publica christiana, are finally starting to converge. Secular historians' new interest in the determining aspects of religious life, church historians' attempts to combine 1he believer's insight with philologico -critical distance, and a common emphasis on methodology illustrate this trend. Recent publication of Newton's theological writings, suppressed and dismissed by his popularizers' trite Deism, show that Newton himself tried to overcome the tremendous tension between faith and reason which his work created. Historians today, living in a period which suggests a resonance with Newton's baroque age, should follow Newton's example and attempt a synthesis of church and secular history.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Paul L. Ward on The Practice of History by G. R. Elton, History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969), 112-119.
Charles S. Maier on Society and Democracy in Germany by Ralf Dahrendorf, History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969), 119-133.
John Clive on Bagehot's Historical Essays by Norman St. John-Stevas, History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969), 133-138.
John Raphael Staude on The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays by George Lichtheim, History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969), 138-144.
Gert Müller on Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives by Talcott Parsons, History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969), 145-156.
M. Małowist on The Shape of Medieval History by William J. Brandt, History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969), 157-161.
ARTICLES
S. C. Humphreys, "History, Economics, and Anthropology: The Work of Karl Polanyi," History and Theory 8, no. 2 (1969), 165-212.
Polanyi's denial of the universal applicability of economic theory must be seen in the context of early socialist economics and the development of the sociology of knowledge by his contemporaries and compatriots Luka6s and Mannheim. Polanyi's classification of economic types to serve as a basis for a comparative, substantive economic theory-reciprocity, householding, redistribution, market exchange -distinguished modes of allocation rather than production. Regulation governing trade, markets, and money in economies of reciprocity and redistribution received particular attention. The classification is useful not so much for identifying economies corresponding to the ideal types as for analyzing the interrelations between subsets of institutions in a single economy. Polanyi's own work on the "port of trade" is an example. His ideas are also used by ancient historians.
Rudolph Binion, "Repeat Performance: A Psychohistorical Study of Leopold III and Belgian Neutrality," History and Theory 8, no. 2 (1969), 213-259.
Leopold III revived Belgium's neutrality, which facilitated Hitler's conquests. Leopold upheld this policy even though he foresaw with anguish that it meant Belgium's destruction. A psychoanalytical explanation is required. Unconsciously, Leopold was imitating his father in many ways; but more importantly, he was reliving an automobile accident in which he had unintentionally driven his wife, Queen Astrid, to her death. Belgium took the dead Queen's place for him unconsciously as he led Belgium to the disaster of May 1940. Reliving a trauma is the normal way of abreacting it. In this case, a private accident had enormous public consequences. The historian's task is the exacting analysis of specific causation such as this.
Larry Shiner, "A Phenomenological Approach to Historical Knowledge," History and Theory 8, no. 2 (1969), 260-274.
Phenomenology can offer a new point of view to the critical philosophy of history. Through a phenomenological reduction which permits an analysis of the essential structures of the "life-world," the phenomenologist suspends theoretical assumptions in order to discern the implicit attitude which defines the field of a science. Phenomenological reflection can help lay bare an original act. When applied to the discipline of history, this process of "reactivation" uncovers the original emergence of historical consciousness and brings to light the structural a priori of the field of historical research. A phenomenological approach to the problem of historical knowledge will be the convergence of the analysis of the essential structures of the historical attitude and the analysis of the historical dimension of the life-world.
Richard G. Ely, Rolf Gruner, and William H. Dray, "Mandelbaum on Historical Narrative: A Discussion," History and Theory 8, no. 2 (1969), 275-294.
Dray: Mandelbaum legislates regarding the historian's "task" in the guise of descriptive analysis. He seems to envisage two fundamental tasks for the historian: explaining, and relating parts to wholes. Contrary to Mandelbaum's implication, there is no more opposition between narration and either of these tasks than there is between the two tasks themselves.
Ely: Mandelbaum refutes White and Danto, who both hold that historical writing is essentially narrative; but not Gallie, who asserts that historical writing is necessarily, but never solely, a narrative construction. The claim that history is essentially narrative is fruitful even though false because it recognizes an important characteristic of historical thinking - the historian's conceptual isolation of a series of intentional human actions from the situations with which they were designed to cope.
Gruner: Mandelbaurn is correct in his criticism of narrativism, but does not support his criticism by good reasons. Historians offer both static, non-narrative descriptions and kinetic, narrative descriptions. Historical description is therefore not the same as historical narration; the latter is only a species of the former.
REVIEW ESSAYS
J. G. A. Pocock on Political Philosophy and Time by John G. Gunnell, History and Theory 8, no. 2 (1969), 295-301.
Christopher Hill on Civilisation Matérielle et Capitalisme (XVe-XVIIIe Siècle), Tome I by Fernand Braudel, History and Theory 8, no. 2 (1969), 301-303.
Kenneth A. Lockridge on From Puritan to Yankee: Character and the Social Order in Connecticut, 1690-1765 by Richard L. Bushman, History and Theory 8, no. 2 (1969), 304-309.
ARTICLES
Bruce Kuklick, "The Mind of the Historian," History and Theory 8, no. 3 (1969), 313-331.
A model constructed from the "ideal observer" ethical theory accounts for many pervasive peculiarities of the craft of history and reflects central elements of the mind of the practicing historian. Both the ideal historian and the ideal observer can be characterized by the same adjec tives: omniscient, disinterested, dispassionate, consistent, objective, and empirical. In discussions of human conduct historians try to make evaluations from the point of view of an ideal observer. The historian's ideal of objectivity, his faith in a basic ontological structure which gives order and intelligibility to the world, and his "method of empathic understanding" (Verstehen) are all illuminated by the model.
Ihor Ševčenko, "Two Varieties of Historical Writing," History and Theory 8, no. 3 (1969), 332-345.
There are two types of historians: the vivid historian or butterfly and the technical historian or caterpillar. The former believes that complete history is neither possible nor desirable. Selection is necessary, and proper selection distinguishes good historians from bad ones. Facts are unimportant in themselves but are used to find underlying principles. The latter puts a premium on the discovery of new facts, letting interpretation take care of itself. While the technical historian's truths are too small, the vivid historian's truth is too big. The differences between the two types, in part temperamental, are also based on the periods in which they work; non-modern historians tend to be technical and modern historians vivid because the former are faced with a scarcity of sources, the latter with an overabundance.
Shirley M. Gruner, "Political Historiography in Restoration France," History and Theory 8, no. 3 (1969), 346-365.
The publication in 1814 of De la monarchie française by Montlosier inaugurated a debate over the development of French history which made the period of the Bourbon Restoration one of the most seminal in French historiography. Montlosier viewed French history as the struggle between the Franks and the Gauls transformed into a struggle between the nobles and the third estate. He felt that this struggle would result eventually in violence and end with the absolute subordination of one group to, the other. While the book was written to justify the nobles, it presented all the details for a class justification of the third estate. The liberals promptly developed "industrialism," which expressed the necessity of reorganizing society along the lines of industry. Though few other history books were published in this period, later Marxian and economic histories could not have been written without the ideas this book stimulated.
Bernard L. Fontana, "American Indian Oral History: An Anthropologist's Note," History and Theory 8, no. 3 (1969), 366-370.
Oral history gives the anthropologist direct access to Indian history. Anthropologists, like historians, are concerned whether oral traditions are "true." Aside from the favored technique of checking the spoken against the written word, the anthropologist must understand the social roles and various literary categories of oral tradition. The anthropologist, unlike the historian, is primarily concerned with culture history and therefore emphasizes the mundane rather than the extraordinary. Finally, anthropologists are as concerned with how other people define' truth for themselves as they are with ascertaining truth from their own cultural perspective.
REVIEW ESSAYS
F. Smith Fussner on Tudor Historical Thought by F. J. Levy, History and Theory 8, no. 3 (1969), 371-387.
Herbert Moller on Karl Marx. Eine Psychographie by Arnold Künzli, History and Theory 8, no. 3 (1969), 388-395.
Philip Merlan on Herder's Social and Political Thought. From Enlightenment to Nationalism by F. M. Barnard, History and Theory 8, no. 3 (1969), 396-404.
Lewis D. Wurgaft on The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present by George G. Iggers, History and Theory 8, no. 3 (1969), 404-418.
Studies in Quantitative History and the Logic of the Social Sciences
Jacob M. Price, “Recent Quantitative Work in History: A Survey of the Main Trends,” History and Theory, Beiheft 9 (1969), 1-13.
Although much of their work contained undeveloped quantitative presuppositions or conclusions, professional historians before 1900 made relatively little use of quantitative data. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the general development of the social sciences, increasing publicity about disputes between rival schools, and the changing relative importance of nations helped to draw historians' attention to quantitative material. As a result of the great breakthroughs in computer technology, this trend has become more pronounced since 1945, especially after 1960. In the next decade most quantitative work in history will be in the fields of economic history, political history, social structure, economic sociology, and historical demography. Nevertheless, the bulk of, historical work will probably continue to be substantially nonquantitative. And even those who otherwise welcome the new approach are worried that historians will begin to master methodology without reference to problems, thereby sacrificing important questions for esthetic satisfactions.
George G. S. Murphy, “On Counterfactual Propositions,” History and Theory, Beiheft 9 (1969), 14-38.
Many historians and philosophers of history hold that no counterfactual. can be given any degree of credibility, and it is true that counterfactuals cannot be logically refuted or confirmed. Yet if everything which is not definitely true is defined as a "fiction," very little is left in human discourse. While certain knowledge is preferable to highly credible knowledge, philosophic speculation suggests that knowledge is at best highly credible. And even though there are no formal methods of handling counterfactuals which would ensure standard results, we do have sound empirical propositions to back up counterfactuals. Counterfactuals have already been used with reasonable degrees of credibility in the areas of policy models, the analysis of consumer surplus, and the analysis of costs and benefits. If history is to go beyond description, counterfactuals must be employed, for without them it would be impossible to, appraise actions and their consequences.
David Braybrooke, “Refinements of Culture in Large-Scale History,” History and Theory, Beiheft 9 (1969), 39-63.
Models of culture and representations of changes in culture as changes between such models can be validated without making unreasonable departures from the validating conditions for basic narratives. Von Wright's logic of norms provides a useful analysis of the concept of rule and hence a basis for constructing models of cultures as systems of rules. As illustrations from historical work on the eighteenth-century origins of the British permanent civil service and on administrative developments in Tudor England show, the logic of norms brings to light the logical issues that are of critical importance to changes in culture. These issues, like the models on which they depend, involve human expectations through involving human conventions; but one must also acknowledge parallel systems of description which can figure in covering-law explanations.
Richard T. Vann, “History and Demography,” History and Theory, Beiheft 9 (1969), 64-78.
The success of historical demography in establishing through statistical means the existence of family limitation in the past demonstrates that the methods of the quantitative social sciences can explain some problems better than traditional historiographical tools. In this case no literary evidence was available, and even if evidence existed it would have been too distorted to be reliable. Such findings may help historians understand broader issues such as the origins of the Industrial Revolution. Historical demography also may provide clues about the revolutionary process in Western Europe. At the same time, the transition within demography itself from a "transversal" to a "longitudinal" style of analysis suggests that it is as important for the social scientist to become "historical" as it is for the historian to become "social-scientific."
Cover image: “Crystal Tree,” by Jr Korpa (6 December 2019)
