Beiheft 8
On Method in the History of Religions
Edited by James S. Helfer
Cover image: “The Inception Church,” by Jr Korpa (11 July 2019)
+ JAMES S. HELFER, Introduction to Beiheft on Method in the History of Religions, History and Theory 7 (December 1968), Bei. 8, 1-7.
The history of religions is grounded in a hermeneutic situation, an interpretative framework that establishes possibilities of creative analysis. The situation of historians of religions often fails to permit an alien world of meaning to retain its integrity because the scholars' ultimate values are threatened. Methodological solipsism - the requirement that descriptions rest on the researcher's own observations - is common. Otto, van der Leeuw, Eliade, and Zaehner are examples of men whose conclusions are too clearly functions of what they assume to be limits of understanding; ultimacy situates scholarship and determines it.
+ MORTON SMITH, Historical Method in the Study of Religion, History and Theory 7 (December 1968), Bei. 8, 8-16.
History can determine neither the origin nor the nature of religion, but it can provide individual histories of individual religions among civilized peoples (with generalizations about patterns perhaps possible later). It can examine the content of the evidence, investigate the background and then interpret and judge reliability. Atheism-the belief that the gods never intervene in the world-is methodologically necessary, for history must try to find the most probable explanation, and this will always be some set of natural causes. Sympathy with the subjects is necessary, but objectivity must be maintained and historical explanation must reckon with the possibility- indeed, the likelihood-of fraud.
+ ROBERT D. BAIRD, Interpretative Categories and the History of Religions, History and Theory 7 (December 1968), Bei. 8, 17-30.
The history of religions is divided into phenomenological and historical branches: the former has no definite interpretative categories but the latter does, namely the "religions" - Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and others. But the "religions" are misleading and preclude understanding, for these categories were imposed before historical research and are neither historical nor religious. A definition of religion is needed to. begin, and Tillich's suggestion - religion is ultimate concern -is functional, enables us to identify what we are looking for, and is non-judgmental. The "religions," on the other hand ' imply an essence of each religion and preclude the examination of the religious experience of each individual in his own terms. The historical study of religion should be undertaken according to areas, not "religions," and the final step should be determination of the "types" of concern-the task of phenomenology.
+ JACOB NEUSNER, Judaism in the History of Religions, History and Theory 7 (December 1968), Bei. 8, 31-45.
Jewish studies comprehend history, theology, law, and practices. It is analogous to an area study; experts in different fields are necessary. Specialists in Jewish history are useful in a history department but must have expertise in a particular time or place. Judaism can be a significant subject for the phenomenology and morphology of religions. Theological concern about the validity of a part of the Judaeo-Christian heritage can be suspended, and Judaism subjected to the sort of study of structures appropriate to Oriental religions. Examination of the transmutation of religion in modern times is especially appropriate. A loss of engagement of feeling is possible today. Non-Jews can study the religion and can depend to a certain extent on translations. Appropriate methods and issues for a study of Judaism must be determined.
+ HANS H. PENNER, Myth and Ritual: A Wasteland or a Forest of Symbols? History and Theory 7 (December 1968), Bei. 8, 46-57.
Anthropology is unabashedly reductionist, seeks "expianations" for ritual, and uses psychology and sociology; the historian of religions seeks understanding" of myths without reduction. Anthropological work is based on Taylor, Spencer, and Frazier and stresses the function of myth for social solidarity, unity of society and the psyche, or as symbolic expression of social relations. But functionalism fails to explain myths since social solidarity is an unintended consequence of myths. History of religions sees myths as encounters with Ultimate Reality. Symbols serve as a framework for rational thought and provide coherent unity to the world. But myths are described as symbols of symbols that refer to the sacred and get lost without a reference. Both methods reject or suspend the cognitive content of myth, and the referent of symbolic myth remains the problem of both disciplines.