Beiheft 9
+ JACOB M. PRICE, Recent Quantitative Work in History: A Survey of the Main Trends, History and Theory 8 (December 1969), Bei. 9, 1-13.
Although much of their work contained undeveloped quantitative presuppositions or conclusions, professional historians before 1900 made relatively little use of quantitative data. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the general development of the social sciences, increasing publicity about disputes between rival schools, and the changing relative importance of nations helped to draw historians' attention to quantitative material. As a result of the great breakthroughs in computer technology, this trend has become more pronounced since 1945, especially after 1960. In the next decade most quantitative work in history will be in the fields of economic history, political history, social structure, economic sociology, and historical demography. Nevertheless, the bulk of, historical work will probably continue to be substantially nonquantitative. And even those who otherwise welcome the new approach are worried that historians will begin to master methodology without reference to problems, thereby sacrificing important questions for esthetic satisfactions.
+ GEORGE G. S. MURPHY, On Counterfactual Propositions, History and Theory 8 (December 1969), Bei. 9, 14-38.
Many historians and philosophers of history hold that no counterfactual. can be given any degree of credibility, and it is true that counterfactuals cannot be logically refuted or confirmed. Yet if everything which is not definitely true is defined as a "fiction," very little is left in human discourse. While certain knowledge is preferable to highly credible knowledge, philosophic speculation suggests that knowledge is at best highly credible. And even though there are no formal methods of handling counterfactuals which would ensure standard results, we do have sound empirical propositions to back up counterfactuals. Counterfactuals have already been used with reasonable degrees of credibility in the areas of policy models, the analysis of consumer surplus, and the analysis of costs and benefits. If history is to go beyond description, counterfactuals must be employed, for without them it would be impossible to, appraise actions and their consequences.
+ DAVID BRAYBROOKE, Refinements of Culture in Large-Scale History, History and Theory 8 (December 1969), Bei. 9, 39-63.
Models of culture and representations of changes in culture as changes between such models can be validated without making unreasonable departures from the validating conditions for basic narratives. Von Wright's logic of norms provides a useful analysis of the concept of rule and hence a basis for constructing models of cultures as systems of rules. As illustrations from historical work on the eighteenth-century origins of the British permanent civil service and on administrative developments in Tudor England show, the logic of norms brings to light the logical issues that are of critical importance to changes in culture. These issues, like the models on which they depend, involve human expectations through involving human conventions; but one must also acknowledge parallel systems of description which can figure in covering-law explanations.
+ RICHARD T. VANN, History and Demography, History and Theory 8 (December 1969), Bei. 9, 64-78.
The success of historical demography in establishing through statistical means the existence of family limitation in the past demonstrates that the methods of the quantitative social sciences can explain some problems better than traditional historiographical tools. In this case no literary evidence was available, and even if evidence existed it would have been too distorted to be reliable. Such findings may help historians understand broader issues such as the origins of the Industrial Revolution. Historical demography also may provide clues about the revolutionary process in Western Europe. At the same time, the transition within demography itself from a "transversal" to a "longitudinal" style of analysis suggests that it is as important for the social scientist to become "historical" as it is for the historian to become "social-scientific."