Volume 19
Written By Elizabeth Boyle
ARTICLES
R. Stephen Humphreys, “The Historian, His Documents, and the Elementary Modes of Historical Thought," History and Theory 19, no. 1 (1980), 1-20.
A new characterization of historical thought which could prove adequate for both historians and philosophers begins with the raw materials of historical inquiry. The approach delineates what modes of thought historians apply to the artifacts which they consider evidence. History, here, is defined as the attempt to give veridical and logically adequate descriptions of change in human affairs. The term description, which refers to a verbal imitation of reality, raises several questions concerning the conceptual limitations, validity, and internal coherence of historical interpretation. There are two modes of historical description. The synchronic mode assumes a nonchanging structure of thought and behavior which is inferred from the text itself. The diachronic mode is an anachronistic form which assumes change and draws on modes of understanding from outside the text. From the latter we can define a model of reality.
Eric Cochrane, “The Transition from Renaissance to Baroque: The Case of Italian Historiography," History and Theory 19, no. 1 (1980), 21-38.
The meaning of the term "baroque" has been the subject of much debate. In the field of historiography, historians have not engaged in a dialogue on the subject and have accepted uncritically the value-judgments of eighteenth-century scholarship. One approach to be used in this author's new book, Historians and Historiography in the Italian Renaissance, compares the work of 782 Italian historians from earliest times through the seventeenth century. The humanist historiography of the Italian Renaissance exhibited the concepts of change, contingency, and epoch in history; relied on ancient forms; used methodological principles of causation; and taught moral and political lessons. Italian Baroque historiography, on the other hand, employed the forms of the new bulletins or avvisi, copied the prose style of its contemporaries, discounted its practical utility, and displayed a separation between history as literature and history as research.
Cynthia Hay, “Historical Theory and Historical Confirmation," History and Theory 19, no. 1 (1980), 39-57.
In his book Our Knowledge of the Historical Past, Murray Murphey argued that historians develop their own theories rather than rely on those of social science. Even the most empirical history uses constructed inferences when it identifies, explains, or interprets historical phenomena. Historical theories often invoke the covering-law model. Though historians are often unaware of their use of theory, their schemata are not different in kind from those of other disciplines. However, Murphey's notion of historical covering laws cannot support the kinds of counterfactuals used in science. Moreover, since historians are not always explicit or rigorous about their use of theory, it is unlikely that such interpretations can fulfill the analytical criteria of the sciences. Finally, Murphey contradicts himself in his discussion of historical confirmation when he demonstrates the difficulty of establishing the empirical adequacy of historical theory.
John Paul Riquelme, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Karl Marx as Symbolic Action," History and Theory 19, no. 1 (1980), 58-72.
In the Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx used the concept of repetition as an interpretation of both historical events and historical narrative. The repetition of actual and symbolic actions also involves a transformation of those events into their opposites. Just as Louis Bonaparte was the farcical reversal of the tragic Napoleon 1, Marx was the theoretical inversion of Hegel. This notion of repetition and reversal was the concept of revolution. Marx was self -conscious of his dual role as antagonist to Louis Bonaparte and as author who brought events and their meaning to conceptual consciousness and transformation. Marx resolved the antithetical drama of tragedy and farce by ironically merging uncle and nephew into one. Marx's historical text, then, brought about a mental revolution by implicitly offering an alternative to the destruction of the previous comedies.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Hayden V. White on Historik by Johann Gustav Droysen, History and Theory 19, no. 1 (1980), 73-93.
Alan Ryan on Historical Explanation. Re-enactment and Practical Inference by Rex Martin, History and Theory 19, no. 1 (1980), 93-100.
J. G. A. Pocock on The Origins of English Individualism. The Family, Property, and Social Transition by Alan Macfarlane, History and Theory 19, no. 1 (1980), 100-105.
ARTICLES
John R. Hall, "The Time of History and the History of Times," History and Theory 19, no. 2 (1980), 113-131.
History, more than other subjects, is confronted with the need to understand the nature of social time. Braudel, representing the objectivist approach, argued that there exists a universal objective world-time permeated by diverse tempi and rhythms. Althusser criticized this view by stating that each level (economic, political, and scientific) within society has its own set of temporal relations. However, Althusser's argument requires not the rejection, but the further understanding of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In order for his concepts to have meaning, they must be based on the meaningful intersubjective relationships of the participants. There is a gap between the philosophical concept of subjective meaning and historical practice. Four phenomenological ideal types of time&endash;synchronic, diachronic, specific, and eternal&endash;can be used to replace objective history with a "history" of times.
Adrian Wilson, "The Infancy of the History of Childhood: An Appraisal of Philippe Ariès," History and Theory 19, no. 2 (1980), 132-153.
Philippe Ariès's book, Centuries of Childhood, has been hailed for over a decade as a leading work on family history. Ari6s compared traditional and modern families and argued that mignotage (coddling) and the teaching of reason during childhood developed only during the modern period. Despite its popularity, the book is severely flawed. First, Ariès uses printed and pictorial art forms as evidence for the sentiments of the period. Second, he does not develop his explanations. Though he remarks about the absence of modern sentiment in traditional families, he does not articulate what the traditional sentiment was. Third, Childhood displays an ambiguous chronology which places the same historical point (the seventeenth century) at different temporal positions (early, middle, and late) within the narrative. Finally, Ariès consciously writes from a present-minded standpoint which limits his own understanding of the material.
Lawrence D. Walker, "A Note on Historical Linguistics and Marc Bloch's Comparative Method," History and Theory 19, no. 2 (1980), 154-164.
Bloch speculated that the future of history might depend upon the comparative method. Whereas the "romantic" method sought the origins of a subject, Bloch's method began with the most recent model. Bloch adopted the comparative method of linguistics. Sewell has identified different levels of comparison in Bloch's work. The most rudimentary is the comparison of evidence from different sources. A second level compares situations in which there is a single outcome variable. A third, "higher" level requires the construction of a criterion model and its comparison with other areas of historical experience. The most fruitful aspect of Bloch's model is that it highlights differences. This demonstrates not only the change of institutions, but their inherent complexities and potentialities. The purpose of Bloch's method was to provide an increased understanding of what he considered the subject matter of science, "men in time."
CLASSICS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
Wilhelm Windelband and Guy Oakes, "History and Natural Science," History and Theory 19, no. 2 (1980), 165-168.
Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) transformed the conception of the history of philosophy from a purely chronological narrative of a specific philosopher to an inquiry into philosophical problems. The collapse of Hegelianism in the mid-nineteenth century was followed by the positivistic view which limited philosophy to problems of logic and epistemology. Such problems were held, in turn, to be resolvable by empirical science. Windelband lashed out at this attitude in his rectorial address at Strasbourg. There, he first set out his distinction between nomothetic and idiographic methods. He argued that truth is a value to which necessity and universality must be ascribed. Just as Kant had considered the natural sciences the legitimate object of philosophical critique, so Windelband conceived the historical sciences. His lecture outlined the problematic later developed by Dilthey and Weber.
Wilhelm Windelband, "Rectorial Address, Strasbourg, 1894," History and Theory 19, no. 2 (1980), 169-185.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Walter L. Adamson on Karl Marx's Theory of History. A Defence by G. A. Cohen; Marx's Interpretation of History by Melvin Rader; and Marx's Theory of History by William H. Shaw, History and Theory 19, no. 2 (1980), 186-204.
James Clifford on Orientalism by Edward W. Said, History and Theory 19, no. 2 (1980), 204-223.
Paul K. Conkin on Truth in History by Oscar Handlin, History and Theory 19, no. 2 (1980), 204-223.
ARTICLES
Dominick LaCapra, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts,” History and Theory 19, no. 3 (1980), 245-276.
Historiography has been dominated by a documentary approach to the reconstruction of the past. For intellectual historians the result has been the treatment of the historical text as a description rather than a dialogue. Though such interpretations recognize the context, they do so in a reductive fashion. This, in effect, restricts the historiography to an ideal type, a heuristic fiction, or a self-conscious defense of the historians' craft. The alternative to the documentary approach, however, is not a view of history as a projection on the present. Such views themselves are dependent upon the reductive tendencies of the documentary approach and become subject to the same criticisms. What is required is a more performative approach which addresses the complex interaction between the language of the text and that of the context.
Robert Anchor, "Lukács as Interpreter of German Culture,” History and Theory 19, no. 3 (1980), 277-293.
Though customarily treated as a secondary theme, Lukács's preoccupation with the German legacy forms the architectonic center of his theory of culture. He studied in Berlin and Heidelberg from 1909-1915, and assimilated a direct line of German intellectual culture from Kant to Hegel to Marx. His transition to Marxism was blocked by his criticism of "vulgar" Marxism and by inability to reconcile the classical interpretation of German culture with his own reading of Marx. The rise of Hitler only confirmed his suspicion that the traditions of Kant and Hegel were radically opposed as reactionary and progressive. Lukács also opposed the romanticism of Kant and Schiller to the rationalism or realism of Hegel and Goethe. Finally, Lukács considered Mann his literary counterpart because of his approach to realism, modernism, and the re-interpretation of German culture.
Philip J. Kain, "Marx's Dialectic Method,” History and Theory 19, no. 3 (1980), 294-312.
The current issue over Marx's Grundrisse and Capital is whether these works represent a unity with or a rupture from his earlier writings. A third interpretation is more adequate than either of these: the new "dialectic method" of the later works transforms elements of his earlier outlooks into a new synthesis. In earlier works Marx describes three processes: the historical generation of the concrete, the historical development of categories, and the methodological ordering of these categories. However, his views changed on which of these processes are primary. In the later works, the third process becomes independent; this modifies his view of the other two processes, and thereby of the relation of consciousness and laws of social development to material conditions.
Arnaldo Momigliano, "A Note on Max Weber's Definition of Judaism as a Pariah-Religion,” History and Theory 19, no. 3 (1980), 313-318.
Max Weber introduced the term "pariah" into the scientific study of Judaism and defined it as the voluntary religious and moral segregation of a people from their host culture. However, problems arise with his explanation. First, Weber defines "guest people" as a group lacking an autonomous political organization but fails to explain why this occurred. Second, he suggests an "ethic of resentment" between those in a "pariah" status and others, but fails to provide evidence that such an attitude existed for the early Jews. Third, he obscures the description of when and where Jews became "pariahs." It seems that Weber misinterpreted the religious segregation dictated by the Talmud with actual legal separation effected by the particular society in which Jews resided. The juridical pact between God and the Jewish nation led to self-regulation rather than the self-abasement characteristic of pariah nations.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Elizabeth A. R. Brown on Medieval French Literature and Law by R. Howard Bloch, History and Theory 19, no. 3 (1980), 319-338.
Marylin Arthur on Anthropology and the Greeks by S. C. Humphreys, History and Theory 19, no. 3 (1980), 338-353.
Rudolf Makkreel on Wilhelm Dilthey. The Critique of Historical Reason by Michael Ermarth, History and Theory 19, no. 3 (1980), 353-362.
Paul L. Ward on America Revised. History Schoolbooks in the Twentieth Century by Frances FitzGerald, History and Theory 19, no. 3 (1980), 362-370.
Metahistory: Six Critiques
Hans Kellner, “A Bedrock of Order: Hayden White's Linguistic Humanism," History and Theory, Beiheft 19 (1980), 1-29.
In Metahistory, White establishes a self-contained system of historical criticism which uses the nineteenth-century historical tradition as its direction and current cultural politics as its strategy. He argues that the flow of human events over time results from an interaction between the rules of tradition and the human mastery of that tradition through free will. After the spirit of Vico and Nietzsche, White considers the historical text a narrative representation which subsumes the logic of explanation. Rather than psychology and sociology, White chooses the trope as the basis of his linguistic system. Within his four-trope system, White identifies his own position as that of the ironic trope. Given tropology as the irreducible element, the four levels themselves become tropological. Metahistory is Metaphoric as it reaffirms human freedom through the creative use of language and Ironic because the rules of discourse place such affirmation "under erasure."
Philip Pomper, “Typologies and Cycles in Intellectual History," History and Theory, Beiheft 19 (1980), 30-38.
Hayden White, in Metahistory, rejects the psychological basis of language and, rather, emphasizes its formal characteristics. However, White assumes the existence of psychological phenomena such as "levels of consciousness" and imagination, which effectively undermines his synthetic principle. Another problem in White's theory is that he only describes the four phases of transition in public moods. His theory, then, suffers from the lack of a dynamic principle of change. In addition, his concept of "dialogical tension" appears a "catch-all" device for dealing with inconsistencies rather than a comprehensive analytical tool. The four typologies themselves assume a deep structure which provides heuristic value at the price of causal explanation. Finally, White attempts to use the trope of Irony as a dynamic principle. However, Irony has no formal restrictions and seems itself founded on disagreement rather than ultimate generative principles. His analysis would have been more convincing if it were limited to a description of literary subcultures rather than assuming theoretical coherence.
Maurice Mandelbaum, “The Presuppositions of Metahistory, “ History and Theory, Beiheft 19 (1980), 39-54.
Within his metahistorical thesis, White makes three assumptions about the nature of historical writing. First, he argues that "histories proper" and "philosophies of history" differ in emphasis and not in content because both share a common narrative strategy. However, White fails to acknowledge the vast differences in scope, principles of interpretation, and meaning between the two disciplines. Second, White assumes that the activity of ordering the historical text is a poetic act. This approach ignores the fact that events and the relationships of those events exist prior to and independent of the historical account. Moreover, his tropological structures are too inflexible to provide a useful understanding of historical discourse. Finally, he never questions the validity of viewing an historical work as a purely linguistic structure. In fact, whereas "histories proper" seem to have much in common to compare and to evaluate, "philosophies of history" almost never agree.
Eugene O. Golob, “The Irony of Nihilism," History and Theory, Beiheft 19 (1980), 55-65.
Hayden White intends his Metahistory to be a contribution to the current discussion of the problem of historical knowledge. In the debate between the positivist and idealist schools, White disclaims both the positivist prescriptions for history as a science, and the idealist perspective of history as an autonomous discipline. Rather, he argues that historians cannot tell the truth about the past because of the limitations inherent in the linguistic structure of texts. White concludes then that the writing of history is aesthetic and moral rather than cognitive. Philosophers such as Collingwood disagree with this perspective and argue that content disciplines and limits the narrative imagination. By abandoning the positivist requirement of universal explanatory laws, one can view human action as infinitely complex and subject perpetually to disagreement and revision. By abandoning the criterion of truth White has destroyed personal responsibility and ultimately freedom itself.
Nancy S. Struever, “Topics in History," History and Theory, Beiheft 19 (1980), 66-79.
In Metahistory, Hayden White chose literary style as that form of rhetoric with which he could better understand the relationship between what historians say and how they say it. By limiting his use of rhetoric to a theory of tropics, White has reduced rhetoric to poetics and rendered his construct antihistorical. Alternatively, one should consider history as both discipline and argument and by extension use a topics rather than a tropics of historical discourse. The rules which govern the narrative argument of history more closely resemble those of law rather than those of literature. Within the discipline of classical rhetoric, it is the lines (topoi) or places (loci) of argument which determine its conviction. Unlike White's poetical use of rhetoric, a topical approach can distinguish between sophisticated and naive argument, can illumine the complex relationship between history and genre, and can evaluate political discourse.
John S. Nelson, “Tropal History and the Social Sciences: Reflections on Struever's Remarks," History and Theory, Beiheft 19 (1980), 80-101.
Struever argues ("Topics in History," Beiheft 19, 66-79) that White's emphasis on language, use of tropology, and adherence to formalism render his theory ahistorical. However, like White, she fails to define either her terms or her rationale for contrasting tropological with topological rhetoric, fails to take responsibility for our times, and fails to delineate clearly her views on the dynamics of history. What is required is further research and elaboration of White's tropal philosophy. A program for this study includes the clarification of a rhetoric for inquiry, of tropes, and of elective affinity. These concepts should then be applied systematically to the disciplines of social science and to philosophy of history. White's concept of irony must also be isolated, sorted, and examined for its resistance to isolation and sorting. Finally, one must address the principles of politics which underlie these concepts, this text, and ultimately texts in general.
Cover image: Design for theater set for the ballet “Les Noces de Thétis,” by Giacomo Torelli da Fano (1654)
