Volume 20
Written By Elizabeth Boyle
ARTICLES
Margit Hurup Nielsen, “Re-Enactment and Reconstruction in Collingwood's Philosophy of History," History and Theory 20 no. 1 (1981), 1-31.
Collingwood's re-enactment doctrine, the notion that the historian must re-enact the past in his own mind, forms the methodological pillar of Collingwood's constructivism. The first tenet of this interpretation states that for the past to be knowable it must have left traces analyzable in the present. Second, the historical process must be rational, which necessitates that the object of knowledge be "re-enactable" and that the subject of knowledge (the historian) be "re-enact-capable." Third, both subject and object must come in contact in an actual act of knowing. Finally, criticism and justification of this reconstruction must constantly take place in order to assure that this reconstruction is actual. This interpretation was developed by Collingwood over several of his works. Our understanding of it is clarified by a study of his unpublished manuscripts, which have only recently been made accessible.
Michael S. Roth, “Foucault's ‘History of the Present,’" History and Theory 20 no. 1 (1981), 32-46.
In The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, and Discipline and Punish, Foucault writes a "history of the present" by showing the connections between the archaeology of knowledge and criticism. In the first, he is fundamentally concerned with the changes in human perception evident at the end of the eighteenth century and the relation of these changes to the fundamental structures of experience. Underlying the history of medicine is the moral and political attempt to link the development of science with the development of bourgeois freedom. In The Order of Things, he cites archaeology as a method of uncovering the fundamental paradigms of cultures and their systems of thought. Finally, in Discipline and Punish, he considers discourse a domain of power relations and thus establishes a link between knowledge and power. A "history of the present" is a self-conscious field of power relations and political struggle.
Jerzy Topolski, “Conditions of Truth of Historical Narratives," History and Theory 20 no. 1 (1981), 47-60.
The classical conception of truth requires modification in order to apply to historical narratives. Historians do not simply discover the past but constitute certain facts about it. The logic of historical narratives is distinctive in three ways. First, the truth of component statements does not guarantee the truth of the whole. Second, narrative may be true as a whole even though some of its statements are false. Finally, a greater proportion of true statements in one narrative does not necessarily make it truer than another. The ,'vertical" structure of the historical narrative consists of the articulated surface stratum, the implicit surface stratum, and the deep (latent or theoretical) stratum. The truth of a narrative is primarily determined by the third of these.
Irmline Veit-Brause, “A Note on Begriffsgeschichte, “ History and Theory 20 no. 1 (1981), 61-67.
In recent years, the focus of historical research has shifted from events to the substructures of large-scale processes. Begriffsgeschichte, represented by the multi-volume Geschichtliche Grundbegrifte, is an analysis of the concepts accompanying such processes and interpretations of them. It is problematic whether such concepts offer adequate historical interpretations or prejudge the analysis. Begriffsgeschichte incorporates history of ideas, historical semantics, and sociology of knowledge; it selects the relevant terms and methods of interpretation for the new social history of ideas. The attempt is to define cultural transition on the basis of changes in language. Specifically examined are changes in the types of communications and in the relative usage of those communications. Begriffsgeschichte describes three kinds of linguistic response to new experiences: the adaptation of traditional meanings, conceptual innovation, and the extension of new meanings to old realities.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Jonathan M. Wiener on Kings or People. Power and the Mandate to Rule by Reinhard Bendix, History and Theory 20, no. 1 (1981), 68-83.
William H. Dray on The Dialectic of Action. A Philosophical Interpretation of History and the Humanities by Frederick A. Olafson, History and Theory 20, no. 1 (1981), 83-91.
G. R. Elton on Clio Unbound. Perception of the Social and Cultural Past in Renaissance England by Arthur B. Ferguson, History and Theory 20, no. 1 (1981), 92-100.
Haskell Fain on Knowledge and Explanation in History. An Introduction to the Philosophy of History by R. F. Atkinson, History and Theory 20, no. 1 (1981), 100-106.
ARTICLES
Joseph V. Femia, "An Historicist Critique of ‘Revisionist’ Methods for Studying the History of Ideas," History and Theory 20, no. 2 (1981), 113-134.
Revisionists such as Quentin Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock, and John Dunn argue that in order to understand an historical text, one must recover the particularity of intended meaning. According to this view, in the sphere of political/ social reality, thought has no universal truth, no independence of its context, no significance for the present, and no meaning beyond the author's intentions. Although this is a variant of classic historicism, it goes far beyond the latter. A study of Gramsci's historicism shows that only the first of the above claims is entailed by historicism or justifiable in its own terms. The revisionist program would prevent us from understanding our own political ideas as they are founded upon our philosophical traditions.
Leon Wieseltier, "Etwas Über Die Judische Historik: Leopold Zunz and the Inception of Modern Jewish Historiography," History and Theory 20, no. 2 (1981), 135-149.
With the publication of Etwas über die rabbinische Literatur (1818), Leopold Zunz argued that Jewish history should be studied by historians and that Jews should adopt history as a way of life. He believed that the role of philology is to present every people with the entire mental development of its culture. Zunz adopted Boeckh's philological categories and proposed that Jewish texts be examined under the ideal of historical and grammatical criticisms. This method ran counter to the traditional evaluation of Jewish texts according to their normative and religious import. Zunz's work exhibits an almost apologetic overtone which implies that Jews were responsible for understanding their own history. This emphasis extended beyond the politics of culture to actual politics. In 1822, a Prussian edict barred Jews, including Zunz, from all civil and academic employment. His quest to establish an identity for Jews in the modern world ended in disillusionment with a culture he. loved but could not live by.
Charles Collier, "History, Culture, and Communication," History and Theory 20, no. 2 (1981), 150-167.
History, like language and other cultural "systems of signification," depends upon the transmission or communication of meaning in time. This implies that history is subject to a process of cultural selection more characteristic of language and that the true objects of historical research and inquiry must be understood as intended communications. The selection of particular elements for use in a cultural system is made on the basis of "place-values" which direct but do not determine the form of the culture. These are neither individual nor comprehensive decisions, but rather are general systems of actions, ideas, and beliefs. Nonetheless, a value has been placed on the elements themselves which indicates that, within the system, their significance is recognized and their preservation intended. There exists a link between fame and the culture's perception of its own influence and greatness over time.
Michael Goodich, "A Note on Sainthood in the Hagiographical Prologue," History and Theory 20, no. 2 (1981), 168-174.
In the thirteenth century, the hagiographical prologue gave its authors an opportunity to reflect upon the theological implications of Catholic sainthood and to define the role of the saint in the divine scheme of salvation. The hagiographers were most frequently either monks or philosophers, and whereas the former would assume a humble stance, the latter would display their dialectical skill. Hagiographers used the opportunity of the prologue to answer critics and to criticize the learned disciplines, especially philosophy. The structure was usually two-part (life and miracles), with an occasional post-mortem. Though most were modeled after the traditional "florilegia," some authors grappled with theological issues.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Donald S. Taylor on History as a Science. Collingwood's Philosophy of History by Willem Johannis van der Dussen, History and Theory 20, no. 2 (1981), 175-182.
Georg G. Iggers on Traditionskritik und Rekonstruktionsversuch. Studien zur Entwicklung von Geschichtswissenschaft und Historischem Denken by Ernst Schulin, History and Theory 20, no. 2 (1981), 182-191.
W. H. Walsh on Kant and the Philosophy of History by Yirmiahu Yovel, History and Theory 20, no. 2 (1981), 191-203.
Peter T. Manicas on States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China by Theda Skocpol, History and Theory 20, no. 2 (1981), 204-218.
Charles Trinkaus on The Idea of Historical Recurrence in Western Thought. From Antiquity to the Reformation by G. W. Trompf, History and Theory 20, no. 2 (1981), 218-231.
ARTICLES
Patrick H. Hutton, "The History of Mentalities: The New Map of Cultural History,” History and Theory 20, no. 3 (1981), 237-259.
The "history of mentalities" considers the attitudes of ordinary people to everyday life. The approach is closely identified with the work of the Annales school. However, whereas the Annales historians refer to the material factors which condition human life, historians investigating mentalities examine psychological underpinnings. Historians who first developed guidelines for the history of mentalities were Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, who were both concerned with collective systems of belief. Later, Philippe Ariès and Norbert Elias identified and developed theories on early childhood. Finally, Michel Foucault considered the psychology of social deviants and nonconformists. This mode of interpretation provides a means of examining those aspects of life which the linear approach cannot address, such as the pressure of conformity, the sense of accelerating time, and the preoccupation with self.
Adrian Oldfield, "Moral Judgments in History,” History and Theory 20, no. 3 (1981), 260-277.
The importance of moral judgment in history has been contested by many historians, including Herbert Butterfield, George Kitson Clark, and E. H. Carr. Butterfield describes moral judgments as outside the historian's realm, imposing limitations on imaginative endeavor, and irrelevant. Clark states that such assessments may be made but by nonhistorians. Carr argues that moral judgment must be made about society and not about private individuals. All of these opinions are incorrect because the authors have failed to define precisely how moral judgment is categorically different from other kinds of historical judgment. The historian's moral interpretation may aid the novice in understanding the past without limiting the more advanced reader. Moreover, the historian has a responsibility to educate which cannot be limited to nonmoral issues.
B. C. Hurst, "The Myth of Historical Evidence,” History and Theory 20, no. 3 (1981), 278-290.
Philosophers of history can be divided into two schools, the realist/ empiricist and the instrumentalist/ constructionist. Both accept that the evidence of the past is given. The "myth of evidence," however, obscures the problematic character of description and prediction as essential activities of historians and archaeologists. To choose between competing claims about a particular event one does not choose between the individual descriptions. Rather, one chooses those narratives with the wider network of truth statements and predictive powers. Once the "myth of evidence" is dispelled, the philosophy of history should provide analyses and programs of data-description and prediction.
F. M. Barnard, "Accounting for Actions: Causality and Teleology,” History and Theory 20, no. 3 (1981), 291-312.
Collingwood's faith in the historian's intuitive capacity for discerning the meaning of past actions by re-enactment" is too unqualified. However, his thesis that through actions alone can reasons and inner meanings be discovered is true. This assumes that actions can be traced to recognizable agents and that these agents are able to acknowledge their reasons. The relation between knowing and doing and between knowing and understanding is a form of causality not inconsistent with teleological reasoning. Characteristic of human action are the constitutive nature of causality, the delimiting effect of rationality on human autonomy, and the role of purpose as a mediating link between intention and outcome. Despite the fact that emphasis on impersonal actions and interactions seriously calls into question Collingwood's theory of understanding, any radical revision of this theory proves no less problematical.
REVIEW ESSAYS
Lynn Hunt on Penser la Révolution Française by Francois Furet, History and Theory 20, no. 3 (1981), 313-323.
Michael Ermarth on Historical Understanding in the Thought of Wilhelm Dilthey by Theodore Plantinga, History and Theory 20, no. 3 (1981), 323-334.
Peter Hardy on Toward a Theory of Historical Narrative. A Case Study in Perso-Islamicate Historiography by Marilyn Robinson Waldman, History and Theory 20, no. 3 (1981), 334-344.
Asa Briggs on George Macaulay Trevelyan by Mary Moorman, History and Theory 20, no. 3 (1981), 344-351.
Studies in Marxist Historical Theory
Philip J. Kain, “Marx's Theory of Ideas," History and Theory, Beiheft 20 (1981), 357-378.
In The German Ideology (1845-1846), Marx developed his notion of "the materialist view of the world," which differed from both the earlier 1844 Manuscripts and the later Grundrisse, Critique of Political Economy, and Capital. First, whereas Marx had distinguished human life from other forms of life as the result of an essence, Marx now argued that material conditions determine the human condition. Second, ideas can affect human life but they are themselves the product of material conditions. Third, though he later reverses himself, he rejects not only the identification but the value of abstractions and categories. Fourth, Marx no longer considers man's history to be a radical self-creation through labor, but a natural self-consciousness modified by productive and social intercourse. Finally, Marx inverted his theory of language and now considered it the product rather than the source of material conditions.
Walter L. Adamson, “Marx's Four Histories: An Approach to His Intellectual Development," History and Theory, Beiheft 20 (1981), 379-402.
Helmut Fleischer has distinguished three different approaches to history in the development of Marx's thinking: the "anthropological" (in the 1844 Manuscripts), the "pragmatological" (in the Theses on Feuerbach and The German Ideology), and the "nomological" (in the Critique of Political Economy and Capital). However, these represent a less continuous and coherent development than Fleischer claims. The 1857 Introduction to the Grundrisse can be instanced as a fourth view, more focused than the others on historiography, and at variance with what Marx says elsewhere. The sequence and overlapping of these four views call into question both the interpretation of Marx's development as smoothly continuous and the interpretation of his development as "ruptured" into "early" and "late."
Robert A. Gorman, “Empirical Marxism," History and Theory, Beiheft 20 (1981), 403-423.
"Empirical Marxism" comprises a number of Marxists from the nineteenth century to the present who have tried to formulate an alternative to the orthodox materialism and determinism which would be more open to verification through empirical science. This interest connects such otherwise diverse thinkers as the empirio-critics, Eduard Bernstein, the Austro-Marxists, Galvano Della Volpe, and Lucio Colletti. In different ways, all of these attempted but failed to resolve the tension between revolutionary theory based on a priori premises and empiricist methodology responsive to factual research.
Howard R. Bernstein, “Marxist Historiography and the Methodology of Research Programs," History and Theory, Beiheft 20 (1981), 424-449.
Marxist historiography has always claimed to be "conceptually" rooted in the natural sciences and has therefore been concerned with the function of laws, the structure of theories, and the logical relations between hypotheses and empirical data. Minimal criteria for the identification of a scientific research program as developed by Lakatos and Laudan include: a negative heuristic; explanatory or predictable scientific theories; a central model or paradigm; identification and solution of internal problems; self-conscious awareness by researchers of a common tradition; and the internal dynamics of conflict and convergence. Less than a generation ago, Marxist scholarship seemed to offer the most innovative methodologies in history. More recently, however, Marxist scholarship seems to be reliving old glories while other approaches (psychohistory, quantitative history, and historical anthropology) have advanced more innovative research programs.
Cover image: Algal blooms on Milford Lake, Kansas, by USGS (26 November 2019)
